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ABSTRACT 
The past four Commandants of the Marine Corps have published their 
intent (Appendix A) to adopt better business practices and transform business 
processes.  The compelling urgency to ensure the Corps achieves optimal 
performance from its limited resources is supported by protracted global 
commitments, increasing labor and technology costs, and lawmaker and 
taxpayer demands for fiscal prudence. 
The Department of Defense, Department of the Navy, and the Marine 
Corps have adopted Continuous Process Improvement (CPI) programs to foster 
a culture of ongoing business transformation and process improvement.  CPI 
techniques such as Value Stream Analysis and Lean Six Sigma are being 
employed at a growing pace to improve processes and redirect savings towards 
core capabilities.   
Workforce optimization is central to the success of these efforts.  
Personnel productivity can be measured using knowledge as a common metric to 
determine value.  Knowledge assets include people and the Information 
Technology systems that improve their abilities to perform their work.   
The Knowledge Value Added (KVA) methodology calculates Return on 
Knowledge (ROK) and utilization rates of knowledge assets.  A case study is 
explored which uses KVA to measure ROK and utilization rates as a means to 
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The war in Iraq—an $11 billion-a-month endeavor involving 
170,000 soldiers and 163,000 contract workers—is one unwieldy 
enterprise. The brass faces relentless pressures overseeing troops, 
managing outside employees, creating new war tactics, and dealing 
with tight budgets. So officials in Washington are sending top-rank 
officers to business schools to learn to think more like their 
corporate peers. (Porter, 2008) 
 
A.   PROBLEM STATEMENT 
For nearly two decades, dozens of federal regulations have been enacted 
which mandate government agency audit compliance for financial accounting 
systems (Budget of the U.S. Government, 2002).  In addition, agencies are 
required to submit annual financial performance measurement statistics to 
demonstrate prudent spending.  However, the public sector with its necessarily 
high standards, global commitments, scarce resources, and lengthy acquisition 
process, has fallen far behind the private sector with respect to leveraging 
modern performance measurement techniques for financial decision-making.  
The Knowledge Value Added (KVA) methodology is gaining in popularity as an 
analysis technique because of its flexibility and scalability to support public 
sector/non-profit operations (Appendix B). 
The nation has generally accepted that the Marine Corps will defend 
America’s freedom whenever called upon to do so, and expects that it will be as 
efficient and effective as possible. In this new age of ideological extremes, 
political discourse, complex and expanding military missions, and uncertain 
timelines and victory conditions, however, even the Marine Corps has to justify 
the cost of its actions.  Although it has tried many methods of performance 
measurement, the Marine Corps lacks a universal technique to measure the 
return value of its financial and human resource management decisions in 
relation to the objectives it pursues.   
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B.   RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
This thesis will demonstrate that the Marine Corps can measure its “bang-
for-the-buck” more accurately than it is currently capable of doing, without 
sacrificing operational effectiveness.  The Knowledge Value Added (KVA) 
methodology has proven itself to be a force enhancer in multiple military 
scenarios (Appendix B), but has yet to be widely tested as a viable methodology 
in the Marine Corps.  The research contained herein will prove that, by using the 
cost and application of knowledge as a common unit of measure, the Marine 
Corps can improve the visibility and application of its financial and human 
resources, enabling more informed and efficient budgetary decisions, more 
accurate and meaningful performance benchmarking, and better personnel 
allocation and utilization.  
This research will use the KVA methodology to establish and compare the 
financial return value of a standard process across multiple Marine Corps 
installations to demonstrate the benefit of KVA as an analysis technique and as a 
viable decision support tool.  The installations will be compared to one another to 
uncover any patterns of knowledge use that might aid in resource allocation 
decision-making.  The impact of IT support on process improvement and 
productivity will also be discussed. 
To be clear, the ultimate value of this research is its confirmation that KVA 
can be used in conjunction with any IT solution on any process, and in concert 
with any ongoing initiatives to aid in producing a quantitative solution to justifying 
resource alignment with priorities. 
C.   RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The thesis will attempt to answer the questions:  
1 – How can the Marine Corps measure the return value of its critical 
processes? 
2 – How can the Marine Corps make justifiable benchmark analyses in 
support of effective budgetary decisions and knowledge asset utilization? 
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D.   METHODOLOGY 
This thesis will model the standard processes and related sub-processes 
of the Military Police (MP) community aboard Marine Corps installations. The 
KVA methodology will be used to establish baseline return values of these 
processes.  The financial and human resource data used in this model will 
include actual Fiscal Year 2005 data collected from installation Business 
Performance Offices (BPO), as compiled by the Marine Corps Business 
Enterprise Office (MCBEO) in Washington, D.C.  The results of the KVA analysis 
will be used to draw conclusions as to the usefulness of the KVA methodology as 
a decision support tool that supports current techniques of process improvement 
in the public sector in general and in the Marine Corps specifically. 
E.   SCOPE 
This research is primarily for the benefit of the Marine Corps Business 
Enterprise Office (MCBEO), but its results can be expanded and interpreted by a 
much larger audience.  Any public sector organization seeking a common 
performance measurement method, especially those who need to consider the 
impact of IT solutions on their current processes, can use this thesis to make 
more effective resource management decisions. 
The scope of the documentation will include applicable laws, policies, 
plans and initiatives that govern and enable the appropriate and efficient use of 
financial and knowledge capital resources aboard Marine Corps installations.  
The range of tools and techniques to be studied includes the historical and 
current methodologies employed by the Marine Corps, the systems from which 
financial data is drawn, the manner in which the data is analyzed, and the end 
users intended to benefit from the data. 
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F.   ORGANIZATION OF THESIS 
This thesis will be organized in the following manner: 
Chapter I provides an overview of the larger problem domain, the specific 
scope of the problem addressed, the research questions that will be answered in 
this thesis, and the methodology and organization used to conduct the research.   
Chapter II contains a detailed review of the pertinent literature to the 
problem domain and elaborates on the methods the Marine Corps has explored 
and is currently using to improve its financial management and performance 
measurement capabilities in support of effective and optimal resource 
management decisions. 
Chapter III is a discussion on the concepts of knowledge, knowledge 
assets, and utilization rates.  The KVA model built for this research is also 
explained in detail. 
Chapter IV is a proof-of-concept KVA analysis case study on the Military 
Police (MP) community aboard Marine Corps installations.  One installation is 
explored in detail using the KVA model from Chapter III, and the findings on 
Utilization Rate, Return on Knowledge (ROK), and Daily Cost are presented and 
analyzed in the larger context of the entire Marine Corps. 
Chapter V presents relevant conclusions from the findings developed in 
Chapter IV.  The research questions from Chapter I are also re-addressed and 
recommendations are made to the Marine Corps financial management and 
analysis community to improve decision making and benchmarking.  Follow-on 
research suggestions are also explored in this chapter. 
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II.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
The Marine Corps is a combat force, not a business. To be 
successful, however, we need to support warfighting excellence 
with well-managed business processes that are both effective and 
efficient.  The Secretary of Defense and Secretary of the Navy have 
emphasized, and the Marine Corps is committed to, business 
transformation in order to optimize resource allocation... The 
Marine Corps will continue to refine our business practices and 
increase the effectiveness of warfighting potential. 
— Gen Michael W. Hagee, 33rd Commandant of the Marine Corps 
 
A.   PERTINENT LAWS AND STATUTES 
The following documents, listed in chronological order, have defined and 
shaped the boundaries of the problem domain over the past two-plus decades.  
They serve as the impetus for all political change and compliance enforcement in 
the realm of financial management issues affecting resource management in the 
public sector. 
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit 
Control Act of 1985.   
The Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 
was designed to end deficit spending. It set annual deficit targets 
for five years, declining to a balanced budget in 1991. If necessary, 
it required across-the-board cuts in programs to comply with the 
deficit targets (Budget of the U.S. Government, 2002). 
Budget Enforcement Act of 1990.  The Budget Enforcement Act was 
enacted in 1990 in an effort to control future budgetary actions. It did this through 
two separate, but related, mechanisms: limits on discretionary spending, and the 
pay-as-you-go process to require that any legislative action on direct spending or 
revenues which would increase the deficit be offset. These procedures currently 
would apply through FY2002 (for legislation enacted before October 1, 2002, for 
measures affecting direct spending or revenues), regardless of whether the 
budget is in deficit or surplus (Saturno, 1998). 
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Chief Financial Officer's Act of 1991.  The CFO Act will lay a foundation for 
comprehensive reform of federal financial management. The act establishes a 
leadership structure, provides for long-range planning, requires audited financial 
statements, and strengthens accountability reporting.  Federal financial 
managers, auditors, and program managers at all levels of government will be 
affected as agencies take actions required under the CFO Act to improve 
financial management systems and information (GAO, 1991). 
Government Performance Results Act (GPRA) of 1993. The purposes of 
this Act are to: 
• improve the confidence of the American people in the 
capability of the Federal Government, by systematically 
holding Federal agencies accountable for achieving program 
results;  
• initiate program performance reform with a series of pilot 
projects in setting program goals, measuring program 
performance against those goals, and reporting publicly on 
their progress;  
• improve Federal program effectiveness and public 
accountability by promoting a new focus on results, service 
quality, and customer satisfaction;  
• help Federal managers improve service delivery, by 
requiring that they plan for meeting program objectives and 
by providing them with information about program results 
and service quality;  
• improve congressional decision making by providing more 
objective information on achieving statutory objectives, and 
on the relative effectiveness and efficiency of Federal 
programs and spending; and  
• improve internal management of the Federal Government. 
(National Partnership for Reinventing Government, 2001) 
 
Statement of Federal Financial Accounting Standards #4 of 1995.   
The managerial cost accounting concepts and standards contained 
in this statement are aimed at providing reliable and timely 
information on the full cost of federal programs, their activities, and 
outputs. The cost information can be used by the Congress and 
federal executives in making decisions about allocating federal 
resources, authorizing and modifying programs, and evaluating 
program performance. The cost information can also be used by 
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program managers in making managerial decisions to improve 
operating economy and efficiency.  (Federal Accounting Standards 
Advisory Board, 1995). 
Information Technology Management Reform (Clinger-Cohen) Act of 
1996.  The “Clinger-Cohen Act (CCA) of 1996 provides that the government 
information technology shop be operated exactly as an efficient and profitable 
business would be operated. Acquisition, planning and management of 
technology must be treated as a ‘capital investment’” (U.S. Department of 
Education, n.d.). 
Management Initiative Decision 901: Establishing Performance Outcomes 
and Tracking Performance Results (2002).  MID 901:  
requires OSD establish a framework for executive-level 
performance goals and tracking results.  This MID shifts the 
department’s focus to outcome results and aligns us to the 2001 
QDR Risk Management framework.  MID 901 assigns responsibility 
for refining and cascading performance metrics to the component 
level and requires each component appoint a GO/SES level 
Performance Management Coordinator (PMC) (MID 901, 2002). 
Management Initiative Decision 910): Budget and Performance Integration 
Initiative (2002).  OSD released MID 901 along with MID 910.   
MID 910 expands the President’s Management Agenda initiative on 
Budget and Performance Integration.  MID 910 reinforces the effort 
to cascade responsibility for implementing the President’s 
Executive Scorecard on the Budget and Performance Integration to 
the Components..  Each Component will be “graded” on its status 
and progress in: 
• Displaying the linkage of plans-outputs-resources in budget 
justification materials. 
• Expanding the treatment of metrics in the FY2004 
congressional justification materials. 
• Establishing a quarterly system reporting on progress 
towards performance goals.  (MID 910, 2002) 
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B. RELEVANT POLICIES TO MARINE CORPS INSTALLATIONS 
The following unclassified regulations and policies are listed in chain-of-
command descending order, each providing increasingly more detailed guidance 
on financial performance measurement aboard Marine Corps installations: 
President's Management Agenda (PMA) of 2001.  The PMA “is a bold 
strategy for improving the management and performance of the federal 
government. The Agenda contains five government-wide and nine agency-
specific goals to improve federal management and deliver results that matter to 
the American people” (U.S. Government, 2001). Its five government goals 
include: 
• Strategic Management of Human Capital 
• Competitive Sourcing 
• Improved Financial Performance 
• Expanded Electronic Government 
• Budget and Performance Integration 
Its nine agency-specific goals are: 
• Faith-based and Community Initiatives,  
• Privatization of Military Housing,  
• Better Research and Development Investment Criteria,  
• Elimination of Fraud and Error in Student Aid Programs and 
Deficiencies in Financial Management,  
• Housing and Urban Development Management and Performance,  
• Broadened Health Insurance Coverage through State Initiatives,  
• A "Right-Sized" Overseas Presence,  
• Reform of Food Aid Programs,  
• Coordination of Veteran's Affairs and Defense Programs and 
Systems. 
National Security Strategy (NSS) of 2002. The NSS defined America’s 
security situation, posture, and plan for success in the post-911 era.  The 
following concepts (National Security Strategy of the United States, 2002) laid 
the groundwork for the subsequent 2004 National Military Strategy (NMS): 
• Champion Aspirations for Human Dignity 
• Strengthen Alliances to Defeat Global Terrorism and Work to 
Prevent Attacks Against Us and Our Friends 
• Work with others to Defuse Regional Conflicts 
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• Prevent Our Enemies from Threatening Us, Our Allies, and Our 
Friends with Weapons of Mass Destruction 
• Ignite a New Era of Global Economic Growth through Free Markets 
and Free Trade 
• Expand the Circle of Development by Opening Societies and 
Building the Infrastructure of Democracy 
• Develop Agendas for Cooperative Action with the Other Main 
Centers of Global Power 
• Transform America’s National Security Institutions to Meet the 
Challenges and Opportunities of the Twenty-First Century 
National Military Strategy (NMS) of 2004.  “The NMS provides focus for 
military activities by defining a set of interrelated military objectives from which 
the Service Chiefs and combatant commanders identify desired capabilities and 
against which (Chairman, Joints Chiefs of Staff) CJCS assesses risk”  (National 
Military Strategy of the United States, 2004).  The NMS identified key aspects of 
the security environment and discussed appropriate force size and composition.  
It also identified three military objectives: 
• Protect the United States Against External Attacks and Aggression 
• Prevent Conflict and Surprise Attack 
• Prevail Against Adversaries 
Quadrennial Defense Review of 2006.  “This QDR defines two 
fundamental imperatives for the Department of Defense (Quadrennial Defense 
Review Report, 2006, p.1): 
• Continuing to reorient the Department’s capabilities and forces to 
be more agile in this time of war, to prepare for wider asymmetric 
challenges and to hedge against uncertainty over the next 20 
years. 
• Implementing enterprise-wide changes to ensure that 
organizational structures, processes and procedures effectively 
support its strategic direction. 
Defense Installation Strategic Plan, 2007.  
The 2007 Defense Installations Strategic Plan reflects the 
continuous evolution of the strategic planning process. As part of 
the President’s Management Agenda, Executive Order 13327, 
‘Federal Real Property Asset Management,’ promotes efficient and 
economical use of real property assets. The Federal Real Property 
Council, created by the executive order, issued guiding principles, 
vision, and performance measures which are incorporated in our 
processes and practices. The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review 
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(QDR) directs the implementation of enterprise-wide changes to 
ensure that organizational structures, processes and procedures 
effectively support DoD’s strategic direction (Defense Installations 
Strategic Plan, 2007, p.4). 
DoN Objectives. These annual statements from the Secretary of the Navy 
identify the Department’s top priorities each fiscal year.  For the last three years, 
the DoN Objectives have outlined provided strong focus on optimizing the 
workforce and managing “risk to improve mission effectiveness and safeguard 
the people and resources of the Navy-Marine Corps Team” (Hagee, M., Mullen, 
M., and Winter, D., 2006; Hagee et al., 2007; Conway, J., Roughead, G. and 
Winter, D., 2007). 
Naval Power 21, Oct 2002.  Signed by the Secretary of the Navy, The 
Honorable Gordon England, Chief of Naval Operations, ADM Vern Clark, and 
Commandant of the Marine Corps, Gen James L. Jones, this visionary document 
for the 21st century declares that the Navy-Marine Corps team’s  
top business priority is identifying and increasing the resources 
available to grow and sustain Naval Force core combat capabilities. 
We will eliminate non-core functions that unnecessarily compete for 
resources. We will improve business practices to achieve end-to-
end capabilities in the most economical manner. These business 
practices will focus on continuous process improvement with 
metrics for measurement and evaluation. Resources will not be 
expended that do not support the capabilities and objectives 
identified in this vision (Naval Power 21, 2002, p.3). 
Marine Corps Strategy 21. This strategy contains three goals to achieve 
its vision of being the “premier expeditionary total force in readiness,” one of 
which is “to optimize the Corps’ operating forces, support and sustainment base, 
and unique capabilities to respond to the complex spectrum of crises and 
conflicts” (Marine Corps Strategy 21, 2000, p.7). 
Marine Corps Installations 2020 (2001). This vision document focuses 
specifically on the mission of the garrison supporting establishments and serves 
to “provide a common vision for our bases and stations to keep pace with force 
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modernization and changing operational requirements outlined in Marine Corps 
Strategy 21” (Marine Corps Installations Strategic Plan, 2004). 
Marine Corps Installations Strategic Plan (2004).  This document is “a six-
year road map, working toward achieving the Installations 2020 vision” (Marine 
Corps Installations Strategic Plan, 2004).  It clarifies the role of Marine Corps 
installations as the ““fifth element” of the Marine Air Ground Task Forces 
(MAGTFs) because of their close and critical link to the operating forces. 
Installations must transition in step with the warfighters’ changing requirements. 
By diligently pursuing the enclosed installation goals, strategies, measures, and 
performance targets, our bases and stations will be poised to meet the needs of 
the warfighter in the 21st century” (Marine Corps Installations Strategic Plan, 
2004). 
Commandant's White Letter, Jan ‘98: Better Business Practices. This 
personal communication from Gen Charles C. Krulak, 31st Commandant of the 
Marine Corps, declared to all General Officers, Commanding Officers, and 
Officers-in-Charge that  
leading the Marine Corps into the 21st Century demands that we 
embrace a revolution in business affairs.  This revolution has 
transformed the way private sector businesses operate by 
minimizing overhead, reducing costs, and increasing 
responsiveness.  The Marine Corps must d the same.  The reality 
of constrained resources, personnel cuts required in the 
Quadrennial Defense Review, and overhead reductions mandated 
by the Defense Reform Inititative requires that we aggressively 
seek greater efficiencies.  To do less risks cuts in the operating 
forces and falling behind the demands of 21st Century warfare 
(CMC White Letter 2-98, 1998). 
Commandant's White Letter, Sep ‘04: Transforming Our Business 
Processes.  This personal communication from Gen Michael W. Hagee, 33rd 
Commandant of the Marine Corps, directed all General Officers, Commanding 
Officers, and Officers-in-Charge to “take bold, informed actions that transform the 
way we conduct our business operations to both maximize prudent use of our 
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resources and to free to free up resources to fund future Marine Air Ground Task 
Force (MAGTF) capabilities” (CMC White Letter 06-04, 2004). 
Marine Corps Business Enterprise (MCBE) Strategic Plan, 3 Nov 2004.  
“This plan sets forth strategy, principles, measures, and action guidance to 
achieve end-to-end assessment and improvement of our business processes” 
(MCBE Strategic Plan, 2004, Introduction).  This plan replaced the initial USMC 
Business Plan of 14 July 2000, which called for a “plan to identify and implement 
organizational, structural, and personnel (civilian and military) changes 
necessary to sustain best business practices” (Official ACMC message, 2002).   
Establishment of USMC Installation Business Performance Offices (BPO), 
April 2002.  This Assistant Commandant-released message formally announced 
the structure and mission of the installation BPO’s.  This formal establishment 
represented the accomplishment of the plan mandated by the USMC Business 
Plan.  (Official ACMC message, 2002). 
C.   APPLICABLE GAO REPORTS 
The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) serves as the 
taxpayer’s watchdog.  GAO reports (GAO Reports, 1995-2007) provide impartial 
analyses on all aspects of Government operations.  The reports in Figure 1 
exhibit a number of common themes relevant to this research, including Financial 
Accountability, Performance Measurement, Risk Management, Opportunities, 
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Quadrennial Defense Review: Future Reviews Could Benefit from Improved DoD Analyses and Changes to Legislative Requirements 
 
Sep 2007: 
Defense Business Transformation: Achieving Success Requires a Chief Management Officer to Provide Focus and Sustained Leadership 
 
Oct 2007: 
Defense Business Transformation: A Full-time Chief Management Officer with a Term Appointment Is Needed at  
DoD to Maintain Continuity of Effort and Achieve Sustainable Success 
 
Dec 2007: 
Military Base Realignments and Closures: Cost Estimates Have Increased and Are Likely to Continue to Evolve 
 
Figure 1.   Business Transformation-related GAO Report Timeline. 
 
1. Financial Accountability   
In many reports, GAO stresses poor visibility of funds as a major cause of 
financial mismanagement.  On page 1 of its November 1995 report, GAO 
discusses DoD's efforts to implement the CFO Act, stating that DoD 
does not yet have adequate financial management processes in 
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making process. No military service or other major DoD component 
has been able to withstand the scrutiny of an independent financial 
statement audit.  
Similar statements and numerous examples of poor visibility of funds in 
were cited in subsequent years, such as in the January 2003 report: "The Navy 
did not know how much money was tied up in unliquidated operating obligations 
that could potentially be used for other appropriate needs, and its budgetary 
reports to Congress and financial statements were inaccurate."   
In February 2005, GAO stated, on page 5,  
DoD reported over 200 inventory systems and 450 personnel 
systems. DoD’s fundamentally flawed business systems affect 
mission effectiveness and can contribute to the fraud, waste, and 
abuse that GAO continues to identify. 
Additionally, in the opening statement of its April 2005, the report 
determined,  
DoD still does not have an effective department-wide management 
structure for controlling business systems investments. 
Furthermore, DoD is not in compliance with the National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, which requires the DoD 
Comptroller to determine that system improvements with 
obligations exceeding $1 million meet the criteria specified in the 
act. 
2. Performance Measurement 
Many of the GAO reports listed in Figure 1 suggest that identifying 
financially-supportable strategic goals is a critical prerequisite to fiscal prudence, 
operational success, and resource optimization.  Tying plans to budgets is a 
frequent GAO recommendation, such as in the first paragraph of its March 1997 
report, pointing out that several initiatives have "failed to shift the focus of the 
federal budget process from its longstanding concentration on the items of 
government spending to the results of its programs." 
Two years later, in April 1999, GAO reported on page 2 that  
although most agencies reviewed (30 of 35) defined some type of 
relationship between the program activities of their proposed 
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budgets and the performance goals of their plans, far fewer (14 or 
40 percent of the plans reviewed) translated these relationships into 
budgetary terms—that is, most plans did not explain how funding 
would be allocated to achieve performance goals. 
After another two years, at the request of many heads of departments and 
agencies requested specific solutions from GAO to aid in improving performance 
measurement.  As a result, page 1 of GAO’s August 2001 report describes "a 
framework for agency budget practices that can help guide an agency toward 
incorporating performance information into the budget process."  GAO would 
continue to use this report as an unofficial grading benchmark in subsequent 
reports. 
Recently, GAO reported on page 3 of its March 2007 report that 
DoD needs to (1) develop and implement a viable strategic plan 
with goals, objectives, key milestones, and measures to monitor 
and report on progress in transforming its key business operations, 
and (2) establish a chief management officer to oversee its overall 
business transformation efforts. 
3. Risk Management 
In many of its reports, GAO urges DoD to weigh mission costs against 
associated calculated risks and routinely recommends improvement in risk 
management capabilities.  Secretary of the Navy Donald Winter supports this 
theme in his annual DoN objectives (Hagee, Mullen, and Winter, 2006; Conway, 
Roughead, and Winter 2007): "Establish a corporate risk management and 
mitigation strategy and ensure that Department leaders and managers use risk-
based approaches for planning and problem-solving." 
The roots of this theme go back to GAO’s March 1998 report, which stated 
on page 2, "DoD’s plans to reduce out-year budgets before the magnitude of 
savings are clearly known is not without risk. This risk is that operating units and 
field commanders will not have sufficient funds to meet their readiness needs." 
Continuing in this vein five years later, GAO reiterated the importance of 
risk management on page 12 of its December 2003 report, stating that, 
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DoD recognized that the older equipment items critical to DoD’s 
ability to defeat current threats must be sustained as transformation 
occurs. DoD also recognizes that recapitalization of all elements of 
U.S. forces since the end of the Cold War has been delayed for too 
long. 
This report recommended that DoD reassess its program strategies, 
funding priorities, and risks for selected equipment. 
In the opening sentence of it September 2007 report, GAO stated,  
While DoD’s approach and methodology for the 2006 QDR had 
several strengths, several weaknesses significantly limited the 
review’s usefulness in addressing force structure, personnel 
requirements, and risk associated with executing the national 
defense strategy. 
4. Opportunities 
GAO frequently identifies many opportunities in its reports, and points out 
when DoD succeeds or fails to take advantage of them.  On page 1 of its April 
1996 report, GAO stated "consolidating and eliminating duplicate support 
services for military bases located close to one another, or where similar 
functions are performed at multiple locations."  Nearly two years later, in its 
March 1998 report, GAO stated on page 3 that "significant opportunities exist to 
achieve savings from DRI consolidation, restructuring, and regionalization 
initiatives. DoD has not been able to fully capitalize on the potential offered by 
these initiatives." 
In its March 2000 report on managing in the new millennium, GAO stated 
on page 1 that the Federal Government now has:  
an opportunity and obligation to take a comprehensive look at what 
government should be doing and how it does it. Future fiscal 
challenges call for prudent stewardship of our national government 
to ensure delivery of the services that Americans want, need and 
can afford. 
Last year, GAO observed in its June 2007 report that,  
Federal financial regulators have implemented key practices for 
effective performance management systems in ways that consider 
the unique needs of their organizational cultures and structures, but 
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some have opportunities to improve implementation of certain 
practices as they continue to refine their systems. 
5. Sustained Leadership 
Over the course of the last three years, a new theme has been prevalent 
in GAO reports, on which endorses the need for sustained leadership in support 
of business transformation.  In its June 2005 report on DoD Business 
Transformation, GAO states on page 2:  
This year, we added DoD’s overall approach to business 
transformation to our high-risk list because DoD lacks a strategic 
and integrated business transformation plan and because we have 
concerns over DoD’s lack of adequate management responsibility 
and accountability to achieve and sustain business reform on a 
broad, strategic, department-wide, and integrated basis. 
Continuing on this trend the following year, GAO reiterated in its opening 
statement of its August 2006 report,  
First, DoD should develop and implement a comprehensive, 
integrated, and enterprise-wide business transformation plan. 
Second, GAO continues to support the creation of a chief 
management officer, with the right skills and at the right level within 
the department, to provide the needed sustained leadership to 
oversee the department’s overall business transformation process. 
Second, GAO continues to support the creation of a chief 
management officer, with the right skills and at the right level within 
the department, to provide the needed sustained leadership to 
oversee the department’s overall business transformation process. 
This theme continues to appear in many reports since 2006.  As recently 
as October 2007, GAO declares in its opening statement that,  
DoD has yet to establish (1) a strategic planning process that 
results in a comprehensive, integrated, and enterprise-wide plan or 
set of plans to help guide transformation and (2) a senior official 
who can provide full-time attention and sustained leadership to the 
overall business transformation effort. 
D.   ACTIVITY BASED COSTING/MANAGEMENT (ABC/M) 
The Marine Corps’s strongest historical initiative to measure 
organizational performance and efficient use of resources was its ABC/M 
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Program.  ABC was developed in the late 1980s by the Consortium for Advanced 
Manufacturing-International (CAM-I), and later made popular in business books 
and articles by Robert S. Kaplan.  The concept behind ABC is to establish a 
cause and effect relationship between personnel and the activities they perform, 
as opposed to traditional costing methods which allocate costs based on where 
in the organization the personnel work.  Once activity costs are known, activities 
are linked to the products and services (or Tasks, to which they will henceforth 
be referred) they generate and unit costs are identified (e.g., the cost to produce 
one more product).  Overhead costs (costs to maintain the organization) are also 
identified and are targeted for resource reallocation or process improvement. 
In 1999, the Marine Corps Business Enterprise Office (MCBEO) began 
experimenting with ABC/M as a means to improve financial visibility and cost 
allocation in the Marine Corps.  In July 2003, ABC/M was officially adopted as the 
Marine Corps’s official cost and performance measurement program 
(MARADMIN 320/03, 2003).  Garrison installations were targeted because their 
operating costs are relatively static from year to year and their operating budgets 
and overhead costs are significantly higher than deployable, operating forces, 
presenting more possibilities for cost reduction and process improvement.  
Funding was approved by the Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps to 
establish an ABC Program at every base and station, and personnel were 
assigned to capture relevant cost and performance data in a model and forward it 
to MCBEO for analysis each year.  As the program grew and business-savvy 
leaders recognized the need for additional business expertise to support local 
commanders, Business Performance Offices (BPO) were created at each 
installation, which assumed responsibility for the ABC Program (Appendix A).   
Over the next four fiscal years, the MCBEO and the BPO’s continued to 
establish and refine relevant installation performance standards and metrics, and 
automate the population of the installation ABC models to facilitate analysis.  In 
2005, the ABC program was tied more closely to the Standard Accounting 
Budgeting Reporting System (SABRS) for standardization, automation and 
analysis purposes.   
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Despite robust efforts to automate the collection of data from the 
accounting system, however, the amount of manpower expended to collect non-
automated activity data and to develop meaningful units of measure for every 
Task simply became overwhelming in light of support for increased operational 
tempo and global commitments.  The Marine Corps subsequently suspended its 
ABC Program to pursue more efficient methods of performance measurement 
and cost reduction (see sections E and F below).   (G. Heaivilin, personal 
communication, March 3, 2008) 
E.   CONTINUOUS PROCESS IMPROVEMENT (CPI) 
In May 2006, the Secretary of Defense published the DoD CPI Guidebook, 
which describes the DoD CPI framework as “a strategic approach for developing 
a culture of continuous improvement in the areas of reliability, process cycle 
times, costs in terms of less total resource consumption, quality, and 
productivity.”  The Guidebook advocates the use of Value Stream Analysis and 
Mapping, Theory of Constraints and Lean Six Sigma techniques to foster this 
culture.  “A value stream encompasses all the planning, execution, products, and 
services that go into a process to create value for a customer” (DoD CPI 
Guidebook, 2006).  Figure 2 displays the core value streams in DoD. 
The 2008 DoN Objectives call “for the acceleration of Lean Six Sigma 
(LSS) integration across the DoN in order to develop a culture of continuous 
improvement” (Appendix A).  In January 2008, the Commandant of the Marine 
Corps issued the Continuous Process Improvement (CPI) Implementation policy 
(Appendix A), which announces a pending Marine Corps Order mandating the 
use of CPI tools and techniques in concert with DoD and DoN policy.  The policy 
further establishes nine High Impact Core Value Streams (HICVS), “strategic 
processes that support combat readiness and the warfighter,” intended to focus 
CPI efforts towards the top priorities in the Marine Corps:  
• Acquisition 
• Aviation Material Life Cycle Management (AIRSPEED) 
• Capability Development 
• Human Resources Development 
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• Information Technology 
• Installation Management 
• Resource Allocation 
• Service Advocacy 
• Total Life Cycle Management (Ground) 
 
Figure 2.   Value Streams and the DoD Enterprise. 
 
F.   LEAN SIX SIGMA 
According to Six Sigma Systems, Inc., lean manufacturing is: 
a proven approach to reduce waste and streamline operations.  
Lean manufacturing embraces a philosophy of continually 
increasing the proportion of value added activity of their business 
through ongoing waste elimination.  A lean manufacturing approach 
provides companies with tools to survive in a global market that 
demands higher quality, faster delivery and lower prices (Six Sigma 
Systems, n.d.).  
Six Sigma Systems, Inc. defines Six Sigma as “a philosophy of doing 
business with a focus on eliminating defects through fundamental process 
knowledge.  Six sigma methods integrate principles of business, statistics and 
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engineering to achieve tangible results” (Six Sigma Systems, n.d.).   Sigma is the 
Greek letter used in statistics to denote variance from a mean in a normally-
distributed population (often referred to as a bell curve).  One standard deviation, 
or one sigma, of variance encompasses approximately 68.2% of a population.  
Six sigma includes over 99.9999998% of all members of a population (Tennant, 
2001).  In the Six Sigma process improvement method, the goal is to achieve an 
efficiency rate of six sigma.  Stated another way, the goal is to eliminate six 
sigma worth of defects. 
The concepts of Lean and Six Sigma have been combined to formulate a 
versatile performance improvement methodology that can be applied to any 
measurable process.  When combined into a single methodology, Lean Six 
Sigma (LSS) provides a method for process improvement, focusing on removing 
barriers and non-value added process steps, thus providing better support to the 
people doing the work (LeValley & Fairclough, 2007, p. 4).   
One of the appealing aspects of LSS is its personal recognition system, 
which is patterned after a martial arts program by awarding achievements with 
colored belts for successful cost-saving projects.  With its growing success, LSS 
has been aggressively adopted over the last three years by DoD, DoN, and the 
Marine Corps as the process improvement methodology of choice.  In a letter 
May 3, 2006 memo, Secretary of the Navy Winter said,  
Several elements of the Navy and Marine Corps have engaged in 
LSS activities to include the training of over 500 Black Belts and 
1,500 Green Belts that have facilitated 2,800 events and projects.  
These activities averaged a 4:1 return on investment.  This initiative 
applies to entities engaged in transactional, service and support 
missions (Winter, 2006). 
G.   THE KNOWLEDGE VALUE-ADDED METHODOLOGY 
The Knowledge Value-Added (KVA) methodology provides a framework 
for determining the value of assets within an organizational process.  KVA was 
developed by Dr. Thomas Housel of the Naval Postgraduate School and Dr. 
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Valery Kanevsky of Agilent Labs.  It is a relatively simple, universal, scalable 
method for measuring the value of the knowledge within employees and IT.  
In KVA, knowledge is defined as "the know-how required to produce 
process outputs.  This kind of knowledge is proportionate to the time it takes to 
learn it.  We have found learning time to be a quick and convenient way to 
measure the amount of knowledge contained in any given process" (Housel, 
2005, p.12).  Learning time is measured in terms of common units of time (hours, 
days, weeks, etc.).  A simple KVA analysis example in a military setting may help 
to improve understanding of this methodology: 
Scenario: A Marine conducts daily site surveys to provide physical 
security for an installation.  He learned to conduct these surveys in 
a 28-day formal training course.  Each survey takes 4 hours to 
perform.  His Return on Knowledge (ROK) is calculated as follows:   
ROK = (Output / Input) X Reduction Factor, where: 
 
Output = Learning Time X Times Fired/day X # People 
Input = # People X Times Fired/day X Actual Work Time 
Reduction factor = Proportional adjustment to maintain an intuitive 
percentage ratio 
  
ROK = ((28 days X 1 survey/day) / (1 Marine X 1 survey/day * 0.5 
days)) X 1% = 56%      
 
Furthermore, since the Marine spends 4 of every 8 workday hours 
conducting surveys, if he earns $40,000 annually, then $20,000 can 
be attributed to his 250 daily surveys throughout the year, which 
equates to $80/survey.  (This cost per survey metric may be useful 
for resource allocation and benchmark decisions.) 
 
Reliable estimates of learning time can be made when formal training or 
education requirements exist to execute a core process.  In such a case, the time 
actively spent learning will provide a sound measure of the knowledge required 
(in military settings, formal training is traditionally measured in days).  However, 
in many organizations, knowledge is gained by observation and execution of the 
core processes (typically referred to as OJT, or On-the-Job-Training).  To 
establish reliable OJT estimates, subject matter experts with in-depth familiarity 
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with the processes being analyzed may be surveyed to determine the relative 
time that must be dedicated by an average employee to learn all knowledge to 




































































III. MEASURING THE UTILIZATION OF KNOWLEDGE ASSETS 
One of the most widespread mistakes in performance 
measurement is to use measures that will inevitably make the 
organization, its people and especially its managers look good.  
‘Nobody wants a metric that they don’t score a 95 on.’ (Hammer, 
2007, p.20) 
A. KNOWLEDGE DEFINED 
The knowledge definition debate is as old as Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle 
(Kane, 2003).  For purposes of this research, knowledge is considered a 
collection of related information and experiences that can be utilized to produce a 
desired decision or outcome with respect to situation-specific variables.  As a 
contextual-based element of human cognizance, knowledge is “continually 
renewing, with the physical systems in an organisation retaining knowledge 
because they are encouraged by the managerial systems created, to assist 
learning” (Leonard, 1998).  The context in which knowledge is applied is 
constructed from many pieces of data that form an informational foundation upon 
which effective decisions can be made and acted accordingly. 
 Knowledge can be explicit or tacit.  Explicit knowledge can be taught, 
such as how to navigate a website.  It can be shared easily because it can be 
explained or demonstrated.  Tacit knowledge must be experienced first-hand 
because it involves the simultaneous actions of context sensing, memory 
recollection, and cognitive processing, such as the ability to ride a bicycle or to 
drive a vehicle with a manual transmission (Skyrme, 1997).  Kane differentiates 
the two simply as “there are aspects of what we know that we cannot clearly 
enunciate” (2003). KVA considers explicit knowledge to be gained through formal 
training, and tacit knowledge through on-the-job training (OJT). 
B. KNOWLEDGE ASSETS 
Knowledge assets are humans and/or computer technology that generate 
data, collect information and apply experience to make decisions or produce 
outcomes.  “Measuring the knowledge asset, therefore, means putting a value on 
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people, both as individuals and more importantly on their collective capability, 
and other factors such as the embedded intelligence in an organisation's 
computer systems” (Skyrme, 1997).  The value of knowledge assets can be 
gauged by the ratio of the cost to create the knowledge to its frequency of its use.  
The more often knowledge is applied (i.e. utilization rate) to make a decision or 
produce a desired outcome, the greater the proportional return on that 
knowledge.   
The value of knowledge assets is affected by (1) the over-utilization point, 
which is often called “burnout” and (2) how much of a role Information 
Technology (IT) plays in the acquisition of knowledge.  If IT is used to process 
information in relation to a contextual situation before being acted upon by a 
human, then IT is said to be used a “knowledge enhancer” in KVA calculations.  
If used to generate, collect, store, display, or share information, KVA considers IT 
only a minor additive to knowledge value.  In KVA analysis, the calculation of 
total learning time depends upon the percentage of IT used to gain the 
knowledge as well as whether the IT was used as a knowledge enhancer or a 
minor additive. 
C. UTILIZATION RATES 
Utilization Rate is an important business metric in many industries 
because it allows decision makers to consider the strength and endurance of an 
asset and, hence, predict its future performance.  Accounting and law firms 
determine utilization rate by the ratio of hours billed to clients versus hours 
worked in a given period (Feinberg, 2006).  In a 40 hour work-week, if clients are 
serviced and billed for 10 hours, the utilization rate would be 25% (10 hours / 40 
hours).  The aviation industry’s utilization rate refers to the number of hours per 
aircraft that a fleet of airplanes are in the air on a given day.   These are but two 
examples.  Every industry establishes its own definition and standard of use. 
 Utilization Rate is used in this research to evaluate the value of 
knowledge assets.  In the KVA model discussed below, Utilization Rate is 
calculated by multiplying the number of times a Task is completed in a day by the 
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amount of time the Task takes to complete.  The resulting percentage can then 
be considered in terms of adequate use of knowledge assets.  Sustainable 
Utilization Rates range between 50% and 75% (Feinberg, 2006). 
Example: It takes 0.021 days (10 minutes) to handle a 911/dispatch 
call. 35 calls are handled daily. Utilization Rate = 35 calls X 0.021 
days = 0.735 days, or 73.5%.  
D. KVA MODEL 
Table 1 is a snapshot from the KVA model built for this research.  The 
model employs complex formulae and user input to dynamically look up financial 
and human resource data (ABC Model, 2005).  The data is then used to calculate 








Table 1. KVA Model Snapshot. 
The instructions in the light blue box direct the user to update the blue text 
fields in the upper right corner, including the drop-down lookup selection fields 
“Installation” and “Task,” for which the user desires a KVA analysis.  The fields 
identified with green, numbered boxes are described in greater detail below. 
1. Military Occupational Specialty (MOS).  Military Occupational Specialty 
which requires specific formal training to achieve.  A single MOS may complete 
multiple Tasks. 
2. Operations MOSs.  Military Police who earn an Operations MOS 





Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) Involvement: Task
(Boxes are checked automatically) Investigations ROK Reduction
5805 Criminal Investigation Officer
Operations 5819 Military Police Investigator (E-4 and above)
5803 Military Police Officer 5821 Criminal Investigator CID Agent (E-4 and above)
5811 Basic Military Police (All ranks) 5822 Polygraph Examiner (E-6 and above)
5812 Working Dog Handler (All ranks) Corrections
5813 Accident Investigator (E-4 and above) 5804 Corrections Officer Task costs:
5814 Physical Security Specialist (E-3 and above) 5831 Correctional Specialist (E-1 to E-3) $1,110.76 /Day
5816 Special Reaction Team Member (All ranks) 5832 Correctional Counselor (E-4 and above) $278,801.72 /Year
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Accident Investigators, Physical Security Specialists, and Special Reaction Team 
Members.  These MPs are the proverbial “cops on the beat,” and aim to maintain law 
and order, prevent crimes through routine patrolling, safety programs and community 
involvement, and serve as first responders to incidents. 
3. Investigations MOSs.  Not to be confused with accident investigators, 
MP’s who earn Investigations MOS’s include Criminal Investigation Officers, Military 
Police Investigators, Criminal Investigator CID Agents, and Polygraph Examiners.  
These MP’s are responsible for the in-depth analysis of serious allegations of 
committed acts. 
4. Corrections MOSs.  Military Police serving in the Corrections field 
include Corrections Officers, Specialists, and Counselors.  These MPs are 
responsible for handling convicted offenders of serious acts. 
5. Work Days/Year.  Number of actual workdays in a fiscal year, which 
excludes weekends and holidays. In 2005, there were exactly 251. 
6. Work Hours/Day.  Actual productive working hours in a single work 
day.  A typical work day on a Marine Corps installation is from 0730 to 1630 hours, 
with one hour set aside for lunch, resulting in 8 work hours/day. 
7. OJT Hours/Day.  Number of hours in a workday attributed to learning 
On-the-Job (not in a formal classroom setting).  Any Marine contributing his time 
towards completing a Task for which he has yet to be formally trained is considered 
to be on OJT time.  Actively learning on the job normally occurs for only a fraction of 
the work hours/day.  In KVA analyses, two hours of OJT in every eight hour work 
day is a common standard. 
8. Installation.  A garrison activity that serves as a base of operations for 
tenant commands.  May include air, ground, logistics, or training bases.  Figure 3 
shows the locations of all Marine Corps Installations (MCI).  Installation commanders 
support many diverse tenant commands.  Depending upon the primary purpose of 
the command, garrison organizations have a pre-designator code such as MCB for 
Marine Corps Base, MCAS for Marine Corps Air Station, MCLB for Marine Corps 
Logistics Base, MCRD for Marine Corps Recruit Depot or MCAGTFTC for Marine 




Figure 3.   Marine Corps Installations. 
 
In October 2005, Marine Corps leadership reinforced its philosophy of 
providing direct, customized installation support to area combatant commanders 
by grouping all installations into regions (HQMC Action Memo, 14 July 2005).  
MCI NCR (National Capital Region) is a unique organization dedicated to 
installation support in the immediate area of Washington, D.C. and encompasses 
MCI WEST: 
1:  MCB Camp Pendleton, CA 
2:  MCAS Camp Pendleton, CA 
3:  MCAS Miramar, CA 
4:  MCRD San Diego, CA 
5:  MCLB Barstow, CA 
6:  MCAGTFTC 29 Palms, CA 
7:  MCAS Yuma, AZ 
 
MCI MIDPAC: 
8:  MCB Hawaii, Oahu 
 
MCI WESTPAC: 
9:  MCB Camp Butler, Okinawa 
10: MCAS Iwakuni, Japan 
 
MCI NCR: 
11: Headquarters, Wash., D.C. 
12: MCB Quantico, VA 
 
MCI EAST: 
13: MCAS Cherry Point, NC 
14: MCB Camp Lejeune, NC 
15: MCAS New River, NC 
16: MCAS Beaufort, SC 
17: MCRD Parris Island, SC 














activities at MCB Quantico, VA.  MCI East, headquartered at Camp Lejeune, NC, 
is responsible for garrison support provided aboard MCAS Cherry Point, NC, 
MCB Camp Lejeune, NC, MCAS New River, NC, MCAS Beaufort, SC, MCRD 
Parris Island, SC, and MCLB Albany, GA.  MCI West, out of Camp Pendleton, 
CA, provides installation representation for MCB Camp Pendleton, CA, MCAS 
Camp Pendleton, CA, MCAS Miramar, CA, MCRD San Diego, CA, MCLB 
Barstow, CA, MCAGTFTC Twentynine Palms, CA, and MCAS Yuma, AZ.  MCI 
MIDPAC (Mid-Pacific) is based in Hawaii and provides dedicated garrison 
support to Marine activities aboard Camp Smith and Kaneohe Bay in Hawaii.  
MCI WESTPAC (West Pacific) is responsible for installation support to MCAS 
Iwakuni in mainland Japan and MCB Camp Butler on the island prefecture of 
Okinawa.  MCB Camp Butler is the unified reference name for nine camps 
throughout Okinawa and Camp Fuji in mainland Japan. 
9. Task.  Outcome of applied knowledge.  Generally, the end state 
desired from resources consumed (people, time, and money).  A single Task 
may take multiple MOS’s to generate.  (See Ch, IV, para. B4 for a  list of Tasks 
used in this KVA model.) 
10. ROK Reduction.  A surrogate variable used to offset the high return 
values generated when dollar values are not used in ROK calculations. Typically 
a revenue factor is generated in KVA models using a market comparable dollar 
value. This KVA model, however, uses a ROK Reduction factor to establish the 
ratio of knowledge gained to knowledge used without comparing costs to a 
market comparable.  From a mathematical standpoint, a reduction factor adjusts 
both the numerator and denominator in order to present the final answer in an 
intuitive percentage range while preserving the original output-input ratio. 
11. Cost/Day.  Total labor dollars expended accomplishing a particular 
Task and all its iterations for a single day.  Using actual labor figures makes it 
possible to determine an accurate cost estimate of a process at the individual, 
installation, or Marine Corps level.  Table 2 shows the daily cost of enlisted 
Marines who performed the 911 Dispatch Task at MCAS Cherry Point in 2005 
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(ABC Model, 2005).  Using the KVA model designed for this research, a similar 
cost table can be constructed for every Task on every installation.  (NOTE: a 











E-1 0.000 $0.00 $0.00 
E-2 1.140 $141.49 $161.29 
E-3 2.140 $159.00 $340.26 
E-4 1.360 $185.63 $252.46 
E-5 1.100 $222.02 $244.23 
E-6 0.170 $267.16 $45.42 
E-7 0.100 $311.79 $31.18 
E-8 0.100 $359.31 $35.93 
E-9 0.000 $0.00 $0.00 
 6.110 $1,646.40 $1,110.76 
Table 2. MCAS Cherry Point, NC – Daily 911 Dispatch Cost by Rank. 
 
12. Cost/Year.  Annual cost to accomplish the Task on the selected 
Installation.  Calculated by multiplying the Cost/Day by the Work Days/Year. 
13. Number of Marines.  Number of Marines who contributed to the 
accomplishment of a Task. The numbers are in decimals because (1) not every 
Marine works at a base for an entire year, (2) some Marines get promoted 
throughout the year, (3) Marines have to divide their time completing multiple 
Tasks, and (4) not all of a Marine’s time is spent generating these specific Task – 
they also spend time doing non-essential or non-standard tasks. In the model, 
the Number of Marines is looked up on a separate worksheet with static cell data. 
14. Actual Learning Time.  Actual Learning Time (ALT) in days.  
Comprised of formal training and OJT. In the model, ALT is based on Task and 
OJT hrs/day selected.  The number of formal training days for each rank is 
looked up on a separate worksheet.  If the rank is too low to be offered formal 
training in that Task, the Marine’s time is considered OJT only. 
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15. Times Fired per Day.  Knowledge is fired every time a Task is 
accomplished.  Calculated by dividing the number of tasks completed annually by 
the number of Work Days/Year. 
16. With IT as an Additive.  When Information Technology is used as a 
minor additive to enable personnel to complete Tasks, Actual Learning Time is 
increased by a slight productivity percentage (%IT).  Total Learning Time which 
incorporates IT as a minor additive is measured using the formula, ((Actual 
Learning Time+(Actual Learning Time*%IT))*(Times Fired per day)*(Number of 
Marines). 
17. With IT as an Enhancer.  When Information Technology is used as 
a knowledge enhancer to enable personnel to complete Tasks, Actual Learning 
Time is increased by a significant productivity percentage (%IT). Total Learning 
Time which incorporates IT as a knowledge enhancer is measured using the 
formula, ((Actual Learning Time+(Actual Learning Time/(1-%IT)))*(Times Fired 
per day)*(Number of Marines). 
18. Total Learning Time.  Total Learning Time includes all formal 
training, OJT, and IT support which enables personnel to successfully complete a 
Task.  When no IT is used, Total Learning Time is calculated using the formula, 
(Actual Learning Time)*(Times Fired per day)*(Number of Marines). 
19. Actual Work Time.  Actual Work Time is the number of days it takes 
to accomplish a task. 
20. Utilization Rate.  A productivity ratio often used for personnel and IT 
optimization decisions. Calculated by multiplying the number of Times Fired per 
day by the Actual Work Time. 
21. Total Input per Day. Refers to the amount of Knowledge Asset 
resources put into a Task.  Calculated by the formula, (Times Fired per 
day)*(Number of Marines)*(Actual Work Time), and is used to calculate 
Cost/Day. 
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22. Total Output per Day.  Total output, measured with or without IT.  
The formulas for each are (#People)*(ALT)*(#Fired) and (#Fired)*(TLT), 
respectively. 
23. Return on Knowledge (ROK).  A universal metric generated in a 
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IV. CASE STUDY: USMC MILITARY POLICE COMMUNITY 
Early transformation requires exploiting information technology to 
reform defense business practices. The Department currently is 
pursuing transformational business and planning practices such 
as… output-based management.  Senior leadership must take the 
lead in fostering innovation and adaptation of information age 
technologies and concepts within their organizations, and they must 
ensure that processes and practices that are antithetical to these 
goals are eliminated. (Rumsfeld 2003, April) 
 
A. MILITARY POLICE OVERVIEW 
1. Provost Marshal (PM) Responsibilities 
According to paragraph 1100 of MCO P5580.2A (1998): 
Section D, paragraph 1300 of the Marine Corps Manual (MCMan) 
tasks commanding officers with the responsibility for the 
preservation of good order and discipline.  In accordance with the 
provisions of the MCMan, commanding officers exercise this 
responsibility through the delegation of authority to military police 
for execution of those missions pertaining to law enforcement and 
the maintenance of installation security.  Accordingly, the Provost 
Marshal (PM) serves as the installation commander’s senior law 
enforcement representative and as a special staff officer 
responsible for the operation of the Provost Marshal Office (PMO).  
The PM is charged with responsibility for, and authority to execute, 
the following missions: 
1. Conduct law enforcement operations 
2. Conduct criminal and traffic accident investigations 
3. Provide police community services 
 
2. Governing Documents 
Many orders and directives have been written at the DoD, DoN, Marine 
Corps and installation levels which govern the conduct of the MP community.  
The following are critical governing documents relevant to the performance 
measurement of the community (ABC Model Standards, 2004, p.63). 
MCO P5580.2A Marine Corps Law Enforcement Manual.  “This directive 
establishes general policy pertaining to the missions, organization, authority, 
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jurisdiction, and operational functions of military police organizations aboard U.S. 
Marine Corps installations” (MCO P5580.2A, 1998, p.2). 
MCO 1510.86B Individual Training Standards System for the Military 
Police and Corrections Occupational Field (OCCFD) 58. Individual Training 
Standards  
are used by unit commanders, (Functional Learning Center) 
directors, and (Distance Learning) developers to design, develop, 
conduct, and evaluate the individual training of Marines. Unit 
commanders are responsible for the sustainment of all individual 
tasks that have been deemed, through analysis, to support the 
unit’s Mission Essential Task List (METL). Unit commanders can, 
therefore, use the tasks contained in this order as the basis of 
individual training through Managed On-the-Job Training (MOJT), 
instruction in unit-level schools, or incorporation in their training 
plans (MCO 1510.86B, 2000, p.2).   
This ITS order pertains to all Marines in the Military Police community, as 
denoted by the first two numbers of the Military Occupational Specialty (MOS), 
58. 
MCO 1510.59B Individual Training Standards System for Marine Corps 
Security Forces.  Military Police serving as members of Marine Corps Security 
Forces are subject to the Individual Training Standards contained in this order. 
MCO 5500.6F Arming of Security and Law Enforcement Personnel and 
the Use of Force.  This document provides “uniform procedures and criteria for 
the arming of security/LE personnel, the carrying of firearms, and training on the 
use of force” (MCO 5500.6F, 1995, p.1). 
MCO 5500.18 Crime Prevention.  This purposes of this order are: 
• To establish Marine Corps crime prevention policy. 
• To promulgate Marine Corps regulations on the storage and 
security of privately owned weapons aboard bases, stations and 
posts. 
• To provide guidance on planning, organizing, directing, and 
maintaining installation crime prevention plans. 
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The Crime Prevention Policy is “to protect military personnel and civilian 
employees, their families, and Government assets from criminal acts, by 
minimizing the opportunity and inclination to commit these acts” (MCO 5500.18A, 
1993, p.1). 
MCO 5530.14 Marine Corps Physical Security Program Manual.  “This 
Manual standardizes requirements for physical security aboard Marine Corps 
installations and organizations, as well as (MCO 5530.14, 2000, pp. 1-2): 
• Provides commanders the authority and responsibility to protect 
personnel, facilities, property, and material under their command. 
• Identifies measures to safeguard personnel, facilities, property and 
material at all Marine Corps installations and activities. 
• Provides guidance for evaluating, planning and implementing 
Marine Corps command physical security programs. 
• Establishes minimum standards. 
• Assists those responsible for physical security in their efforts to 
carry out the assigned mission. 
MCO 5510.15A Security of Marine Corps Installations and Resources.  
The purpose of this order is “to establish policy and procedure for Marine Corps 
commanders who are authorized to issue regulations for the protection or 
security of property or places under their command… and to provide guidance 
relative to the enforcement of the law that prohibits unlawful entry” (MCO 
5510.15A, 1993, p.1). 
MCO 1630.4A Law Enforcement and Physical Security Activities.  The 
purpose of this order is “to establish policy and procedures for the uniform 
reporting of law enforcement and physical security activities, in order to submit 
accurate data to the Department of Defense and the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, as required” (MCO 1630.4A, 1991, p.1). 
MCO 1640.6 Marine Corps Corrections Program.  “This Order establishes 
policy, procedures, and responsibilities associated with the Marine Corps 
corrections program” (MCO 1640.6, 2001, p.1). 
MCO P1640.4C Marine Corps Correctional Custody Manual (CCM). 
“Correctional custody is the physical restraint of a person during duty or non-duty 
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hours, or both, imposed (hence, an awardee) as a punishment under Article 15, 
and may include extra duties, fatigue duties, or hard labor and an incident of 
correctional custody” (MCO P1640.4C, 1999, p.1-3).  The purpose of this order is 
“to publish basic policies, standards, and procedures for the operation of Marine 
Corps Correctional Custody Units” (MCO P1640.4C, 1999, p.1). 
MCO 10570.1A DoD Military Working Dog (MWD) Program.  A Military 
Working Dog (MWD) is “any Government owner dog that was procured, acquired 
or bred to meet working dog requirements of the military departments and DoD 
agencies. This regulation sets policies and procedures governing the logistics 
aspects of the DoD (MWD) Program” (MCO 10570.1A, 1990, p.1). 
MCO 5500.14A Flight Line Security Program.  The FLS program is  
designed to enhance the security of the flight line area through a 
systematic employment of personnel and equipment.  Security 
priorities are assigned based on the vulnerability assessment/threat 
and assets being protected.  The installation provost marshal 
serves as the primary staff officer for all FLS matters (MCO 
5500.14A, 1996, p.2). 
 
3. Organizational Structure 
According to MCO P5580.2A (1998), “The organizational structure of the 
Provost Marshal’s Office (PMO) may vary (the office may also be called a Military 
Police Department), but it generally consists of: Police Administration/Services, 
Operations, and Criminal Investigation Division (CID).”  Figure 4 “depicts an ideal 
PMO organizational structure” (MCO P5580.2A, 1998, Fig. 1-1). 
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Figure 4.   PMO Organizational Structure. 
 
4. Primary Functions 
 Table 3 depicts functional areas of responsibility for a PMO (MCO 
P5580.2A, 1998, Fig. 1-2): 
Function Services Operations Investigations 
Patrol   X   
Traffic Enforcement   X   
Military Working Dog (MWD)   X   
Critical Incident Response X X X 
Flightline security   X   
Game Warden   X   
Customs   X   
Installation Access control X X   
Detention Cells   X   
Protective Services     X 
Criminal Investigations     X 
Traffic Accident Investigations   X X 
Polygraph     X 
Special Events X X X 
Registration (Vehicle, Pet, and Weapon) X X   
Crime Prevention X X X 
Physical Security X     
Police Records X X X 
Lost and Found X X   
Vehicle Impound X X   
Animal Control X     
Statistical Reporting X     
Police/Court Liaison X     
Special Reaction Team (SRT)   X   
Training X     
Table 3. Military Police Primary Functions. 
Provost Marshall 
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Patrol 
Traffic 
Military Working Dogs 






5. Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) skills 
The following MOS skills and designators in Table 4 apply to the Military 
Police Occupational Field 58 (MCO P5580.2A, 1998): 
Officer Enlisted 
5803 Military Police Officer 5800 Basic Military Police and Corrections Marine 
5804 Corrections Officer 5811 Military Police 
5805 Criminal Investigation Officer 5812 Working Dog Handler 
 5813 Accident Investigator 
 5814 Physical Security Specialist 
 5816 Special Reaction Team (SRT) Member 
 5819 Military Police Investigator 
 5821 Criminal Investigator CID Agent 
 5822 Forensic Psycho-physiologist (Polygraph Examiner)
 5831 Correctional Specialist 
 5832 Correctional Counselor 
Table 4. Military Police MOS Skills. 
 
B. PROCESSES, SUB-PROCESSES, ACTIVITIES AND TASKS 
1. Standard Installation Processes  
In a KVA analysis, the core processes of an organization are defined and 
the changes that occur to the process inputs within these processes are 
identified.  Various confirmation sources may be used for verification, including 
personal interviews of Subject Matter Experts (SME), surveys of organizational 
leaders and managers, or procedural publications or checklists. 
In the Fiscal Year 2004 Activity Based Costing (ABC) Model Standards, 
the Marine Corps Business Enterprise Office (MCBEO) identified the 37 standard 
processes conducted aboard all Marine Corps installations (Figure 5).  All 
processes conducted aboard Marine Corps installations are included in this 
business model, although not all processes are conducted at all installations.  
One of these processes, “Provide Security,” focuses on the Provost Marshall’s 
(PM) responsibilities to the installation commander for the proper execution of the 
Military Police mission, functions, and skills outlined above. 
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Figure 5.   USMC Installation Process Model. 
 
2. Provide Security Definition 
The MCBEO’s 2004 ABC Model Standards defines “Provide Security” as 
“All activities that provide for the security of the installation to include the conduct 
of criminal investigations, confinement operations, military working dog patrols, 
traffic court, and other Provost Marshall Office (PMO) activities.”  
3. Sub-Processes, Attributes and Activities 
Sub-processes, attributes and activities provide additional detail on the 
high-level “Provide Security” process, enabling a more effective KVA analysis.  
Table 5 serves as a foundation for a functional crosswalk between the 
performance measurement and analysis community and the Military Police 






Provide Installation/Physical Security 
Provide Military Working Dog Patrols 
Provide Flight Line Security 
Provide Emergency and Non-Emergency 
Response 
Crime Prevention 
Support Crime Prevention Activities 
Conduct Criminal Investigations Crime Detection 
Conduct Off-site Investigations  
Court Proceedings Provide Court Proceeding support 
Provide Brig Security  
Provide Prisoner Services  
Detention Operations 
Manage Prisoner Programs 
Enforce Conservation Laws 
Conduct Investigations 
Monitor Outlying Land Areas 





Oversee Access to Environmental Areas 
Provide Access Control 
Enforce Traffic Regulations  




Perform Accident Prevention Activities  
Provide Crime Awareness Briefings/Education 
Programs 






Table 5. Military Police Sub-processes and Activities. 
 
4. Tasks and Units of Measure 
The Tasks listed in Table 6 are the common outputs generated from the 
Provide Security process.  Each Task has a quantitative Unit of Measure that 
indicates the number of times an acquired knowledge has been used, or “fired” 
(ABC Model Standards, 2005).  The list is not intended to be exhaustive of every 
PMO.  Rather, it signifies the outcomes of the common processes conducted at 
every installation. 
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Table 6. Military Police Tasks and Units of Measure. 
 
C. KNOWLEDGE FLOW 
Figure 6 is a graphic depiction of how knowledge is acquired and utilized 
within a military community at an installation.  A description of each numbered 
entity is provided on the following pages. 
Task Unit of Measure 
911 dispatch Number of man hours 
Accident investigations/reconstruction Number of man hours 
Adjudged Confinement Number of prisoners and duration 
Animal Control Number of animals processed 
Conduct complete investigation on 
assumable cases 
Number of investigations 
Conduct preliminary investigation on 
referable cases 
Number of investigations 
Correctional Custody Unit Number of detainees 
Crime Prevention/Physical Security Number of physical security surveys 
Customs operations Number of man hours 
Drug Detection Number of missions 
Emergency Response Number of responses 
Explosive Detection Number of man hours 
Flight Line Security Number of man hours 
Game Warden services Number of man hours 
Installation access control Number of man hours 
Intrusion Detection System monitoring Number of man hours 
MP patrols Number of man hours 
MWD law enforcement security patrols Number of man hours 
Non-emergency patrol police services Number of man hours 
Non-law enforcement action Number of events 
Pass Issued Number of passes issued 
Police records/reports Number of reports distributed 
Pretrial Confinement Number of detainees 
Protective Service Operations Number of man hours 
SRT emergency response Number of man hours 
SRT security details Number of man hours 
Traffic Court/Board liaison Number of hearings attended 
Traffic warning/ticket issued Number of tickets/warnings 
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Figure 6.   Knowledge and Performance Measurement Causal Loop Diagram. 
 
1. Personnel (Input) 
Personnel (1) hold a Rank (1a) which has a set Pay Rate (1b).  A School 
(2) requires a Minimum Rank (2a) and is scheduled for a certain number of 
Training Days (2b).  (Ex: A Marine who earns the rank of Lance Corporal (LCpl) 
earned an annual pay of $39,909 in 2005.  As a LCpl, he was allowed to attend 
the Military Working Dog Supervisor course, which was 20 days in duration.) 
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2. Education Loop 
Personnel (1) attend a School (2) that provides Training (3), earn an MOS 
(4), and become part of a specific Community (5).  (Ex: A LCpl who attends the 
MWD Supervisor course earns the 5812 MOS, and is part of the Military Police 
Community.) 
3. Mission Loop 
A Community (5) is comprised of Functional Areas (5a) which have 
assigned Missions (8) that are broken into measureable Mission Essential Tasks 
(8a).  (Ex: The Military Police Community is comprised of 26 Functional Areas, 
each of which is assigned a Mission – The Military Working Dog FA is assigned 
the mission of training and employing dogs in support of garrison law 
enforcement or combat operations.) 
4. Installation Loop 
A Community (5) also exists aboard Installations (6) which follow or 
publish Orders (7) that dictate Missions (8).  (Ex: The Military Police Community 
aboard Marine Corps Base Camp Pendleton publishes Base Orders or follows 
Marine Corps Orders such as NAVMC 3500.10, MILITARY POLICE AND 
CORRECTIONS TRAINING AND READINESS MANUAL, in order to remain 
proficient in their duties.)  Missions (8) are performed by those with the 
appropriate MOS(4).  (Ex: The mission to perform first aid on a MWD is 
performed only by Marines with the 5812 MOS.) 
5. Performance (Output) 
Installations (6) perform standard Processes (9) that are broken into Sub-
processes (10) which complete Tasks (11) whose performance can be monitored 
with Units of Measure (11a).  (Ex: Camp Pendleton performs the Standard 
Marine Corps Installation Process of “Providing Security” which generates 
products and services such as MWD Security Patrols.  Units of Measure (such as 
Return on Knowledge (ROK)) are used to monitor how well these Tasks are 
provided.  (Ex: The ROK of a MWD Security Patrol can be calculated by dividing 
the number of times knowledge of conducting a MWD Security Patrol is fired by 
the amount of hours it takes to learn how to conduct such a patrol.) 
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D.  DATA COLLECTION METHODOLOGY 
1. Assumptions 
MOS involvement.  In order to determine which MOS skills directly relate 
to a specific task, the NAVMC 3500.10, Military Police Corrections and Training 
Manual, was consulted.  Table 7 is a logical crosswalk between the MOS 
descriptions in this manual and the Tasks listed in Table 6. 
Table 7. MOS-to-Task Crosswalk. 
 
Work Days per Year.  Although there are a specific number of work days 
in a given fiscal year, not every Marine works every day due to illness, vacation, 
travel, etc.  It was assumed that all installation experience a proportional amount 
of personnel time lost, therefore it was not necessary to factor in that level of 
detail. 
Work Hours per Day.  Using the same logic as Work Days per Year, it was 
assumed that all installations experienced the same amount of fluctuations in 





































































































































































































































































































































































5811 Basic Military Police X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
5812 Working Dog Handler X
5813 Accident Investigator X X
5814 Physical Security Specia list X X
5816 Special Reaction Team Member X X X
5819 Military Police Investigator X X X
5821 Criminal Investigator CID Agent X X X X X X X X X
5822 Polygraph Examiner X X X X
5831 Correctional Special ist X X
5832 Correctional Counselor X
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Installations.  In the Marine Corps, installations are run by independent 
chains of command from the tenant commands which may use the installation as 
an operating base for training or deployment preparation.  This KVA model only 
considers the knowledge assets used to maintain the installation infrastructure, 
not the deployable commands which reside upon it. 
Learning time.  It was assumed that every Marine who contributed to the 
accomplishment of a Task had received the appropriate formal training for his 
rank.  Likewise, those who did not have sufficient rank to attend formal training 
for a particular Task were assumed to be conducting On-the-Job Training (OJT) 
for calculation purposes.  (For a list of formal training days for each MOS and 
Task, refer to Appendix C.) 
Percent IT Support.  No conclusive data exists to attribute a specific 
amount of IT support to the learning time of the Tasks.  Therefore, the following 
reasonable estimations were made for demonstration purposes.  Depending 
upon local conditions, definitions, and leadership experience, percentages may 
change from installation to installation.  The Tasks that use IT as a Knowledge 
Enhancer (%IT-KE) or as a Minor Additive (%IT-MA) are listed in Table 8: 
 
Task %IT-KE %IT-MA 
911 dispatch 0% 50% 
Accident investigations/reconstruction 15% 0% 
Conduct complete investigation on assumable cases 0% 10% 
Conduct preliminary investigation on referable cases 0% 5% 
Customs operations 0% 15% 
Drug Detection 5% 0% 
Explosive Detection 5% 0% 
Flight Line Security 10% 0% 
Game Warden services 0% 5% 
Intrusion Detection System monitoring 60% 0% 
Non-emergency patrol police services 0% 5% 
Pass Issued 10% 0% 
Police records/reports 35% 0% 
Pretrial Confinement 0% 5% 
SRT emergency response 5% 0% 
Traffic warning/ticket issued 0% 5% 
Table 8. Percent of IT Support per Task. 
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Actual Work Time.  Estimations of Task duration were used to calculate 
AWT, as there is no standard used within the MP community, and experiences 
vary widely.  These estimations do not detract from the intent to demonstrate the 
effectiveness of the KVA methodology, as they can be adjusted to fit the user’s 
situational knowledge.  Table 9 lists the estimated Actual Work Time used for 
each Task in this model:  
Task AWT 
911 dispatch 10 min 
Accident investigations/reconstruction 30 min 
Adjudged Confinement 6 hrs 
Animal Control 1 hr 
Conduct complete investigation on assumable cases 3 days 
Conduct preliminary investigation on referable cases 2 days 
Correctional Custody Unit 12 hrs 
Crime Prevention/Physical Security 4 hrs 
Customs operations 4 hrs 
Drug Detection 4 hrs 
Emergency Response 15 min 
Explosive Detection 6 hrs 
Flight Line Security 5 min 
Game Warden services 1 hr 
Installation access control 1 min 
Intrusion Detection System monitoring 10 min 
MP patrols 2 min 
MWD law enforcement security patrols 10 min 
Non-emergency patrol police services 1.5 min 
Non-law enforcement action 8 hrs 
Pass Issued 1 min 
Police records/reports 30 min 
Pretrial Confinement 1 hr 
Protective Service Operations 3 hrs 
SRT emergency response 2 hrs 
SRT security details 2 hrs 
Traffic Court/Board liaison 3 hrs 
Traffic warning/ticket issued 15 min 
Table 9. Estimated Actual Work Time per Task. 
Cost/Year.  Pay and allowances depend upon rank, years of service, 
operational assignments, bonuses, deductions, tax status, and other factors. In 
this model, average salaries for each rank were established using the data 
collected at each installation (ABC Model, 2005). 
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2. Labor and Knowledge Usage 
There is no direct relationship between labor and knowledge usage.  
Annual labor usage is calculated by multiplying the number of actual hours 
worked per day times the number of actual work days per year.  However, not all 
labor hours are driven towards standard Tasks.  It is not uncommon for 
personnel to perform locally specific Tasks mandated by the installation 
commander, supervisors, leaders, and managers.  Likewise, not all labor hours 
are spent using acquired knowledge.  For example, a Marine works eight hours 
per day for 250 days in a year (2000 man-hours).  He may spend an average of 
seven hours per day using knowledge gained from formal and informal training 
and one hour per day traveling, taking periodic breaks, or assisting another 
Marine in a Task for which he was not trained.  In this case, only 1,750 man-
hours would be measured (7/8 of each day) towards standard Tasks.  
3. Length of Sample Period. 
As discussed in Chapter II, the data used in this model was collected over 
the entire Fiscal Year 2005 (October 2004 – September 2005) by the Marine 
Corps installation Business Performance Offices (BPO).  This sample period 
lends itself well to analysis since budget and expense decisions are typically 
made in increments of one fiscal year.  Formal school quotas are also structured 
on a fiscal year basis.  Finally, the period is long enough to establish reliable 
trend data, but short enough to observe and analyze for near-term resource 
allocation decisions and manpower adjustments. 
4. Learning Time 
Learning Time is comprised of two distinct sources: formal classroom 
training and informal, on-the-job training.  In order to collect this data, the MOS 
Roadmap handbooks were consulted.  These handbooks contain all of the 
relevant formal training schools and courses for each rank and MOS.  The 
number of formal classroom days for each school and course (Appendix C) were 
loaded into the KVA model along with the minimum rank required to attend.  This 
method allowed the dividing line between formal and informal training to become 
visible for calculation purposes. 
50 
E. INSTALLATION KVA ANALYSIS 
Table 10 is an analysis of all MP Tasks performed in 2005 at MCAS 
Cherry Point, NC.  This installation was randomly chosen from among the 16 
Marine Corps installations from which cost and performance data was collected.  
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Emergency Response 0.150 150.00 6.41 0% 0% 150.00 0.031 133.55% 0.01 224.36 28474.58% $35.89
Animal Control 0.130 385.00 0.74 0% 0% 385.00 0.125 71.25% 0.00 40.76 15459.46% $35.58
Non-emergency patrol police services 1.060 60.00 256.65 5% 0% 63.00 0.003 75.66% 0.23 2,313.44 10097.75% $275.30
Pass Issued 3.800 49.00 321.80 0% 10% 54.44 0.002 17.64% 0.50 2,502.86 4992.49% $1,082.52
Flight Line Security 3.070 56.00 104.99 0% 10% 62.22 0.010 35.62% 0.81 933.23 1158.71% $559.02
MWD law enforcement security patrols 4.960 196.00 29.07 0% 0% 196.00 0.021 12.21% 1.31 1,424.32 1084.94% $956.96
Intrusion Detection System monitoring 6.110 70.00 34.90 0% 60% 175.00 0.021 11.90% 1.07 872.51 815.78% $1,110.76
MP patrols 13.680 64.00 127.03 0% 0% 64.00 0.004 3.87% 1.68 1,016.22 606.19% $2,545.38
Installation access control 30.770 64.00 385.03 0% 0% 64.00 0.002 2.61% 5.89 3,080.22 522.55% $5,617.13
Protective Service Operations 0.270 45.00 0.98 0% 0% 45.00 0.250 90.75% 0.03 15.44 498.83% $52.86
Police records/reports 1.390 50.00 13.83 0% 35% 76.92 0.063 62.18% 0.36 150.00 419.75% $336.13
911 dispatch 6.110 82.00 34.90 50% 0% 123.00 0.021 11.90% 1.07 440.05 411.44% $1,110.76
Crime Prevention/Physical Security 1.020 196.00 1.05 0% 0% 196.00 0.500 51.36% 0.17 29.34 172.99% $272.48
Accident investigations/reconstruction 2.580 30.00 36.59 0% 15% 35.29 0.063 88.64% 3.15 430.47 136.75% $493.85
Customs operations 0.620 56.00 1.47 15% 0% 64.40 0.500 118.24% 0.10 13.49 128.47% $114.54
Conduct complete investigation on assumable cases 2.410 1062.00 0.32 10% 0% 1168.20 3.000 40.17% 0.73 82.78 113.74% $657.61
Explosive Detection 0.370 32.00 0.20 0% 5% 33.68 0.750 41.19% 0.02 1.71 73.53% $71.71
Traffic Court/Board liaison 0.610 20.00 2.09 0% 0% 20.00 0.375 128.58% 0.12 7.37 60.93% $166.99
Drug Detection 0.710 32.00 0.18 0% 5% 33.68 0.500 12.91% 0.03 1.54 54.53% $137.40
Conduct preliminary investigation on referable cases 5.380 254.00 0.16 5% 0% 266.70 2.000 5.78% 0.52 8.65 16.64% $1,468.49
SRT security details 6.930 35.00 1.53 0% 0% 35.00 0.250 5.52% 0.88 7.65 8.73% $1,320.34
Non-law enforcement action 2.240 25.00 0.23 0% 0% 25.00 1.000 10.32% 0.19 0.44 2.37% $508.67
94.370 1360.14 9.491 65.85% 18.86 13,596.85 720.88% $18,930.37
 
Table 10. Installation KVA Analysis. 
 
1. Average Utilization Rate 
Average Utilization Rate is the ratio of the amount of time it takes to 
complete a Task to the number of times the Task is performed daily, adjusted for 
the number of Marines who perform it.  For example, Table 10 shows 321.8 
passes per day being issued at a rate of 0.002 days (1 minute) each by 3.8 
Marines, resulting in an Average Utilization Rate of 17.64% (321.8 passes * 
0.002 days / 3.8 Marines).  At such a low rate, it is likely these Marines perform 
additional Tasks each day.  In fact, a high utilization rate does not necessarily 
indicate that the Task was performed by the same Marine.  It is simply an 
indicator that the Task was performed for an extended amount of time.  Marines 
can and often do share the burden of accomplishing extended Tasks. 
Of the 22 standard installation tasks conducted at MCAS Cherry Point, 
five are over 80% Average Utilization Rate (red cells), four are between 50% and 
80% (light green cells), and 13 are below 50% (pale yellow cells).  This macro 
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snapshot allows the installation Provost Marshal (PM) to visualize his Military 
Police department’s overall productivity, which he can calculate by using the 
same formula for all his Tasks (1360.14 Times Fired * 9.49 man-days / 94.37 
Marines), resulting in an organizational Average Utilization Rate of 65.85% 
which, by all accounts, is an indefinitely maintainable rate.  Likewise, he can see 
which Tasks are taking exceptionally little or significant amount of time (yellow or 
red cells, respectively). 
2. Return on Knowledge 
An alternate performance metric from Average Utilization Rate, Return on 
Knowledge (ROK) provides a measure of the value of a process with respect the 
time it takes to learn it.  The bubble chart in Figure 7 graphically illustrates the 
mutually exclusive relationships between Average Utilization Rate, Return on 
Knowledge, and Daily Cost.  Each bubble represents a single Task.  The higher 
up on the chart a Task appears, the higher its Average Utilization Rate.  The 
further right it appears, the higher its Daily Cost.   The larger it is, the larger its 
ROK.  Ideally, a leader would want a Task to appear in the fourth bar of the 
graph (60-80% Average Utilization Rate), all the way to the left, which would 
indicate a low-cost, indefinitely sustainable Task.  (Also, the leader would want 
the bubble to be as large as possible, although he may have relatively little 
control over (1) how long it takes to learn a Task and (2) how often that Task is 
performed.) 
There is no direct relationship between Tasks with a high ROK and Tasks 
with a high Average Utilization Rate.  For example, “Flight Line Security” (dark 
purple) and “MWD law enforcement security patrols” (coral) both generate an 
ROK of approximately 1100% (notice their bubbles are almost identical in size).  
However, Flight Line Security has nearly three times the Average Utilization Rate 




Figure 7.   ROK, Average Utilization Rate, and Daily Cost. 
 
3. Cost as a Decision Factor 
KVA is designed to support leadership decisions regarding any type of 
resource usage and allocation in support of a process.  As the literary review in 
Chapter II suggests, the most important resource tends to be financial.  However, 
this research paper focuses on knowledge assets, i.e. human and IT resources, 
as the decision-maker’s primary resource, with cost being considered a 
dependent variable of labor.   
To put a dollar value on the processes in the KVA model above, an 
average salary is calculated for each Marine.  The Average Actual Total Income 
rates shown in Table 11 are for Marine Corps enlisted personnel, and were used 
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E-1 $31,537 $14,822 
E-2 $35,513 $16,614 
E-3 $39,909 $19,470 
E-4 $46,593 $22,807 
E-5 $55,728 $27,382 
E-6 $67,058 $31,429 
E-7 $78,259 $37,036 
E-8 $90,186 $45,273 
E-9 $108,956 $53,460 
Table 11. Average Actual Total Income vs. Basic Pay Chart Averages. 
 
It is important to note that the costs used in the KVA model built for this 
research were based on the Average Actual Total Income (average payday 
earnings), not the Basic Pay Chart Averages.  The Average Actual Total Income 
amounts present a more accurate picture of true knowledge cost because they 
take into consideration the number of years a Marine has served as well as all 
his actual income, which could include one or more of nearly 70 different special 
pay and allowances received for a current assignment.  Examples include 
taxable pay for hazardous duty incentive, imminent danger, reenlistment bonus, 
sea, aviation, parachutist, diving, and foreign language proficiency, as well as 
tax-exempt allowances for housing, subsistence, family separation and cost of 
living, just to name a few. 
Stepping back to the “30,000 foot view,” Table 12 below shows the macro-
perspective of all processes across the entire MP community at all Marine Corps 
installations.  This useful analytical report generated by the KVA model shows 
community leaders, particularly at Headquarters, Marine Corps and at the formal 
schools, exactly how many MP’s are being employed for each Task at each 































































































































































































911 dispatch $0 $853 $238 $1,111 $958 $718 $0 $0 $0 $446 $1,345 $0 $779 $676 $3,183 $0 $10,306 
Accident 
investigations/ 
reconstruction $409 $401 $0 $494 $25 $919 $72 $417 $0 $333 $4,352 $0 $779 $2,065 $6,135 $462 $16,863 
Adjudged 
Confinement $0 $0 $0 $0 $1,015 $638 $0 $0 $0 $0 $4,817 $3,168 $779 $671 $6,687 $0 $17,775 








referable cases $0 $422 $0 $1,468 $1,032 $744 $48 $417 $0 $397 $495 $444 $779 $671 $1,624 $926 $9,468 
Correctional 
Custody Unit $0 $0 $0 $0 $6 $638 $0 $0 $0 $0 $652 $6,223 $779 $671 $0 $0 $8,968 
Crime 
Prevention/ 
Physical Security $389 $1,821 $111 $272 $910 $238 $34 $0 $0 $520 $750 $3,451 $779 $671 $3,183 $1,308 $14,436 
Customs 
operations $0 $261 $0 $115 $376 $238 $0 $0 $0 $0 $756 $3,451 $779 $671 $3,183 $0 $9,830 
Drug Detection $0 $261 $0 $137 $47 $799 $28 $0 $0 $493 $888 $344 $779 $671 $3,183 $0 $7,630 
Emergency 
Response $0 $1,485 $0 $36 $358 $209 $28 $0 $0 $372 $2,540 $0 $779 $671 $3,183 $0 $9,660 
Explosive 
Detection $0 $261 $0 $72 $47 $774 $14 $0 $0 $413 $1,753 $344 $779 $671 $1,624 $0 $6,753 
Flight Line 
Security $412 $2,781 $0 $559 $602 $209 $318 $0 $0 $0 $675 $0 $779 $671 $0 $0 $7,006 
Game Warden 
services $0 $239 $0 $0 $36 $66 $8 $0 $0 $0 $652 $3,451 $779 $671 $1,624 $0 $7,526 
Installation 
access control $1,487 $3,660 $0 $5,617 $750 $209 $281 $0 $137 $361 $2,074 $420 $779 $671 $1,624 $0 $18,070 
Intrusion 
Detection System 
monitoring $583 $321 $0 $1,111 $535 $209 $34 $0 $0 $302 $652 $0 $779 $671 $1,624 $0 $6,820 
MP patrols $3,565 $2,346 $741 $2,545 $2,283 $945 $661 $0 $1,247 $1,039 $14,090 $0 $779 $671 $3,183 $3,927 $38,020 
MWD law 
enforcement 
security patrols $493 $2,266 $0 $957 $555 $209 $28 $0 $0 $587 $3,470 $344 $779 $671 $3,183 $730 $14,270 
Non-emergency 
patrol police 
services $143 $2,267 $0 $275 $15 $718 $151 $0 $0 $772 $652 $0 $779 $671 $0 $0 $6,444 
Non-law 
enforcement 
action $2,490 $470 $143 $509 $1,389 $567 $67 $0 $0 $595 $296 $49 $779 $963 $0 $0 $8,317 
Pass Issued $970 $266 $670 $1,083 $337 $567 $0 $0 $0 $766 $331 $149 $779 $963 $22 $501 $7,404 
Police records/ 
reports $0 $1,479 $0 $336 $800 $919 $186 $0 $0 $0 $2,395 $95 $779 $671 $3,183 $313 $11,155 
Pretrial 
Confinement $0 $239 $0 $0 $425 $638 $0 $64 $379 $0 $4,963 $3,144 $779 $671 $6,687 $0 $17,989 
Protective 
Service 
Operations $0 $239 $0 $53 $551 $209 $0 $13,459 $0 $0 $652 $0 $779 $671 $3,183 $0 $19,795 
SRT emergency 
response $0 $281 $0 $0 $26 $1,058 $91 $0 $0 $0 $1,735 $118 $779 $671 $3,183 $0 $7,941 
SRT security 
details $0 $33 $0 $1,320 $77 $1,058 $104 $0 $0 $0 $652 $281 $779 $671 $3,183 $0 $8,157 
Traffic 
Court/Board 
liaison $699 $10 $0 $167 $168 $282 $9 $0 $0 $835 $451 $95 $779 $671 $1,624 $396 $6,188 
Traffic warning/ 
ticket issued $0 $484 $1,164 $0 $14 $614 $165 $0 $0 $0 $490 $340 $779 $963 $22 $72 $5,106 
Total Cost/Day $12,338 $25,186 $3,067 $18,930 $13,412 $15,374 $2,382 $15,192 $2,837 $8,784 $54,567 $29,361 $21,806 $21,064 $69,113 $10,079 $323,492 
Number of 
Marines 64.73 129.95 16.92 94.37 71.46 76.98 13.24 78.81 13.30 44.50 303.80 153.46 116.20 97.27 351.93 47.42 1,674.34 
Daily Cost per 
Marine $191 $194 $181 $201 $188 $200 $180 $193 $213 $197 $180 $191 $188 $217 $196 $213 $3,121 
Table 12. Daily Cost of all MP Processes. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The war on terrorism does not supplant the need to transform DoD; 
instead, we must accelerate our organizational, operational, 
business, and process reforms. 
— Donald H. Rumsfeld, Former Secretary of Defense (MCBE  
Strategic Plan 2004, Preface) 
 
Efficiency equals effectiveness.  We all need to be cognizant of the 
fact that when we spend a dollar, if we're not spending it well, then 
we are taking it out of our combat capability. 
— Gordon R. England, Secretary of Defense (MCBE Strategic  
Plan, 2004, Preface) 
 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
In this thesis, the goals of the Federal Government, DoD, USMC, and the 
American taxpayer were considered to be in concert with the definition of 
“strategy,” according to Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1-1:  
At its most basic, strategy is a matter of figuring out what we need 
to achieve, determining the best way to use the resources at our 
disposal to achieve it, and then executing the plan. (MCBE 
Strategic Plan, 2004, Introduction) 
A common adage is that “time equals money.”  The Secretary of the Navy 
has said that people are the Department’s most precious resource.  To 
implement a strategy as defined above, time, money, and people must be used 
optimally.  If leaders focus too heavily on optimizing time and money, and not 
enough on personnel productivity, true optimization will not be possible.  
Personnel productivity must be quantitatively measured with respect to 
organizational goals.  Techniques for performance measurement, benchmarking, 
and process improvement must be flexible enough to ensure long-term stability.   
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Where no quantitative measurement technique appears possible, the KVA 
methodology can still be utilized simply because it measures the value produced 
by the people, not the process itself. 
A baseline process value estimation system can serve as the proper 
foundation for Continuous Process Improvement efforts.  Value Stream Mapping 
and Analysis encompasses all the planning, execution, products, and services 
that go into a process to create value for a customer.  KVA supports this intent by 
establishing a common metric to measure the productivity of personnel as they 
generate products and services for any process. 
  The KVA model presented in this research serves two purposes: (1) to 
explain the construction and operation of the KVA methodology using a standard 
spreadsheet program as a medium and (2) to demonstrate the scalability and 
flexibility of KVA as a useful decision support tool at multiple levels of command.  
The analysis in Chapter IV explained how KVA increases the Provost Marshal’s 
(PM) situational awareness of how resources are being used in support of 
assigned responsibilities and functions, enabling policies and procedures to be 
adjusted or personnel and IT to be reallocated to the Tasks which require more 
knowledge assets.  Periodically, the PM may elect to validate the collected data, 
the Actual Work Time, or the percent of IT used to support a Task.  He may also 
consider any anomalies during the year, which may have skewed the annual 
figures. 
1. Measuring Return Value 
The primary intent of this research was to answer the question, “How can 
the Marine Corps measure the return value of its critical processes?”  As 
evidenced by the detailed KVA model analysis in Chapters III and IV, return 
value can be measured using a universal cost/benefit ratio of knowledge used to 
knowledge learned.  The MP community was used as an example to 
demonstrate that Return on Knowledge (ROK) and Utilization Rate are two 
metrics that should be used to optimize knowledge assets for all processes, and 
that KVA is a simple, universal, flexible, scalable calculation methodology.  ROK 
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can be used in conjunction with other metrics such as Utilization Rate and Daily 
Cost to optimize processes with the most efficient mix of personnel and IT 
support.   
Utilization rate of knowledge assets is a metric worthy of particular 
attention because it can be used to analyze saturation points in personnel 
productivity.  Ideally, a utilization rate of 60-80% can be maintained indefinitely, 
and leaders should seek to increase ROK as much as possible without over 
utilizing their resources.   
In order to lower Utilization Rate, a decision maker’s first reaction may be 
to commit more personnel from an under utilized to an over utilized Task.  
However, more people means more input, which may lower the ROK.  To 
maintain a high ROK without increasing Utilization Rate, leaders may opt to 
invest in IT which improves Total Learning Time (TLT) and reduces Actual Work 
Time (AWT), which will subsequently improve Total Output and allow output to 
keep pace with the increased input of adding more personnel to a Task. 
With respect to cost as a decision factor, a macro-perspective analysis of 
the entire MP community was conducted in Chapter IV, which allows decision 
makers to ask resource allocation questions such as: 
1. What are the causes of the apparent anomalies at certain 
installations, such as the high costs of Protective Service Operations at 
MCAS Miramar, of Correctional Custody Unit (CCU) at MCB Camp Lejeune, 
and of MP Patrols at MCB Camp Butler? 
The answers may be as simple as: 
• MCAS Miramar attributed nearly all its MP costs to the Protective 
Service Operations process, which gave that installation an unusually 
high result.   
• Camp Lejeune’s CCU costs may be justifiably high because it operates 
the largest non-joint CCU in the Marine Corps. 
• Camp Butler’s voluminous MP Patrols may be a factor of not only 
being located in a foreign nation, but of being a conglomerate of 10 
individual camps throughout Okinawa and mainland Japan.  Hence, 
the extensive patrols may be justifiable. 
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2. The average daily cost per Marine is approximately $195 
regardless of the number of Marines or processes performed.  What causes 
some installations’ manpower to cost only $180-$185 per Marine, while 
others are over $210? 
This question raises an excellent point, which is typical of a macro 
perspective: cost per person.  If all PM’s have similar responsibilities and are 
proportionally and adequately staffed, it is reasonable to expect per capita labor 
costs to be similar from installation to installation, not fluctuate 10% from the 
mean.  Such a fluctuation may identify the need for a detailed review of the Table 
of Organization for each installation, and adjusting the manpower assignments to 
spreadload the effort more evenly across the Marine Corps. 
3. When comparing the Average Utilization Rates for the Tasks at 
MCAS Cherry Point in Table 10 their respective costs in Table 12, it is 
interesting that the high Utilization Rates are not necessarily in expensive 
Tasks.  What causes a Task process to become bottlenecked and how can 
installation PM’s use this data to better allocate personnel to streamline 
those processes? 
This question focuses more on a micro-perspective that would interest an 
installation PM vice Headquarters, Marine Corps.  High Average Utilization Rates 
which suggest insufficient staffing for a Task may be easily corrected by 
implementing a policy change to accommodate surges in a particular process.  
Another solution to over utilization is a Business Process Reengineering (BPR) 
study on that process in order to improve the efficiency of a Task.  The infusion 
of Information Technology (IT) into a process is often considered in BPR studies 
because it may improve ROK and reduce Utilization Rates. 
All these questions and answers depend upon unique factors for each 
location, such as high operational tempo, cost of living, or deployment support.  
Regardless of unique variables that can make benchmarking difficult, a report 
like this aids in the improvement of performance measurement from year to year, 
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and can support or defend funding and staffing adjustments simply by providing a 
focal point for decision makers to plan strategies for process improvement. 
2. Benchmarking Installations and Processes 
If KVA is the best option for benchmarking, the follow-on question comes 
naturally: “How can the Marine Corps make fair benchmark analyses in support 
of effective budgetary decisions?”  The answer, however, may not come as 
naturally.  As the Marine Corps learned through its intense, five-year ABC 
program, data collection can quickly reach a point of diminishing returns.  KVA 
solves two show-stopping problems typically associated with ABC:  
(1) KVA does not attempt to attribute all organizational costs to a 
measurable activity.  Instead, it allows leaders and managers at all levels to 
maintain awareness of critical processes and the resources used to accomplish 
important tasks.  When the processes and tasks are standardized across multiple 
organizations, effective benchmarking becomes possible and can be used to 
justify additional resources or defend against funding cuts and force reduction. 
(2) KVA does not require personnel to be manually associated with 
disparate tasks, a time-consuming effort.  By virtue of a person’s skill set and 
qualifications, analysis can be done automatically, based on input and output.  
Multiple linkages between resources, activities, and costs need to be done. 
Cost data is helpful in benchmarking both the personnel and cost to 
perform a specific process at a specific location.  Commanders, leaders, and 
managers can use these benchmarks to compare how other installations 
accomplish the same Tasks with different ranks and numbers of personnel.  By 
monitoring costs of tasks and skill sets across multiple organizations (see Table 
12), formal training can be tailored to locations that need it most and staffing 
efficiencies can be made at installations on a more consistent basis. 
KVA naturally supports Continuous Process Improvement (CPI) initiatives.  
The CPI philosophy advocates an environment of constant awareness of process 
efficiency and resource utilization, as does KVA.  Lean Six Sigma, a results-
based process improvement technique for minimizing waste, has been adopted 
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as the method of choice across DoD, DoN, and the Marine Corps for 
implementing CPI initiatives.  KVA supports Lean Six Sigma as a low-cost 
performance measurement technique to aid in the implementation of, and 
maintain the successes from, Lean Six Sigma projects.  KVA is also ideally 
suited to aid in Value Stream Analyses by virtue of the fact that it can provide a 
defendable performance measurement metric where none may exist by simply 
placing a value on the knowledge used in a process. 
The analysis contained in this document represented a solution to 
establish quantifiable performance metrics for all processes, including those 
which may be qualitative in nature, by using knowledge value as a measuring 
stick.  By filling the gap in resource management, value analysis and process 
improvement, KVA presents itself as a valuable methodology for improving 
efficiency.  This capability provides LSS project managers with a defensible 
metric of measuring value, and can be used to support the budgeting process.  
Finally, applying this methodology to establish and track the value-added of an 
Information Technology solution in a process provides leaders the ability to make 
sound investment decisions. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. MARINE CORPS 
I say transforming because transformation is less a destination and 
more of a journey. We have to shorten every process we have. The 
people at the top get it and the troops get it as well. They know 
things go too slow with too many people chopping on things that go 
through this place. It is the middle level that is the last to get it. I am 
encouraged that we have good support at the top and good support 
at the bottom. So it is kind of the middle that we are encircling right 
now. (Rumsfeld 2003, February) 
 
The 2004 National Military Strategy declares,  
The Armed Forces must remain ready to fight even as they 
transform and transform even as they fight. Adopting an “in-stride” 
approach to transformation – through rapid prototyping, field 
experimentation, organizational redesign and concept development 
– will ensure U.S. military superiority remains unmatched. Such an 
approach requires effective balancing of resources. 
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In the same vein, the Marine Corps Business Enterprise Strategic Plan 
supports DoD business transformation initiatives and emphasizes the business 
transformation concepts of Naval Power 21: 
1. Implementing business initiatives rapidly to free resources for 
warfighting capability 
2. Identifying and increasing resources available to grow and sustain core 
combat capabilities 
3. Improving business practices to achieve end-to-end capabilities in the 
most economical manner 
4. Divesting/disinvesting in legacy systems and platforms no longer 
integral to mission accomplishment 
5. Eliminating non-core functions that unnecessarily compete for 
resources 
6. Increasing scrutiny on current year fiscal operations 
7. Examining critically and continually all aspects of the DON to 
determine how to reap efficiencies across all headquarters, acquisition, 
research, operating force, and field support activities 
 
This body of research demonstrated the capability of the KVA 
methodology to seamlessly augment these concepts, respectively, by: (1) 
supporting CPI initiatives such as Value Stream Analysis and Lean Six Sigma, 
(2) increase resource optimization, (3) improving business practices through 
benchmark analysis, (4) identifying non-integral IT systems in support of 
processes, (5) uncovering processes which drain resources away from core 
functions, (6) providing immediate analysis at multiple levels of command to 
ensure fiscal prudence, and (7) examining quantitatively all processes which 
employ knowledge assets. 
It is with the intent of supporting ongoing efforts that the following 
recommendations are made: 
1: The Marine Corps would greatly benefit from increased education and 
awareness of the KVA methodology as a decision support tool.  KVA classes 
would be a valuable asset to include in organizational and individual training 
plans.  In addition to being relatively easy to learn and employ, there is no 
proprietary software required.  This cost-effective solution is in keeping with the 
Marine Corps intent to avoid costly, proprietary legacy solutions. 
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2: KVA provides a framework to fairly determine and allocate revenue 
value to knowledge assets by describing all outputs in common units. As such, 
the Marine Corps can use Return on Knowledge (ROK) as a reliable, standard 
measure of value for qualitative processes that require a quantitative 
measurement of value, especially those in support of Lean Six Sigma initiatives. 
3: This research brought to light that data collection was less complex 
using learning time statistics.  Should the Marine Corps adopt the KVA principles, 
it would be beneficial for benchmarking purposes to develop a standard learning 
time repository for core processes.  In addition, for those processes which 
emulate the private sector, the repository would be an ideal location to capture 
market comparable learning times and costs for more detailed KVA analyses. 
4: As discussed throughout this research, KVA can be scaled to suit the 
perspective of any level of command, from supervisors in charge of a few 
individuals all the way to service-wide processes.  A KVA Program 
implementation would be more effective if designed with scalability in mind, much 
like the Global Command and Control System (GCCS) provides simultaneous, 
real-time battlefield data to commanders and every level and location. 
5: Many commands across the Marine Corps use Strategic Plans and 
maintain local balanced scorecards to monitor command performance in pursuit 
of goals and objectives.  KVA can generate meaningful performance metrics for 
balanced scorecards and help leadership make better technology investment 
decisions. 
C. FOLLOW-ON RESEARCH POTENTIAL 
Like most assets, knowledge is only valuable if it can be 
transmuted in goods and services that people will pay for. Here we 
get into leveraging knowledge, looking at adding value through its 
development. Here we move into new areas of knowledge 
networking and knowledge utilities – people enriching the 
knowledge asset through collaborative work. (Skyrme, 1997) 
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Throughout the course of this research, the scope needed to be held to a 
manageable limit.  However, many questions arose that would make ideal 
springboards for future research, including: 
• “How can the point of diminishing returns be established on performance 
measurement techniques such as KVA?” 
• “When does data collection and analysis becomes more expensive than 
the savings it predicts?” 
• “How do we know when we are done cutting fat before we start hitting the 
bone?” 
• “How can IT be leveraged to improve the speed and accuracy of 
measuring organizational performance?” 
• “With such a short refresh cycle for Information Technology these days, 
how can open source solutions be employed to reduce risk and ease the 
burden of upgrading technology?”   
• “How can ever-changing priorities be incorporated into a performance 
measurement system to ensure only the important metrics are being 
tracked?” 
• “What would an all-encompassing performance measurement system look 
like and how could KVA be programmed into it to provide dynamic, 
customizable reports on-demand?” 
KVA may be able to provide statistical support to answer these and similar 
questions.  This author challenges future graduate school students to critically 
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APPENDIX A: USMC BUSINESS POLICIES 
• 31st Commandant of the Marine Corps, Gen Charles C. Krulak: CMC 
White Letter 2-98 BETTER BUSINESS PRACTICES 
• 32nd Commandant of the Marine Corps, Gen James L. Jones: USMC 
Business Plan of 14 July 2000 and Establishment of Business 
Performance Offices at USMC Installations on 18 Apr 2002 
• 33rd Commandant of the Marine Corps, Gen Michael W. Hagee: CMC White 
Letter 6-04 TRANSFORMING OUR BUSINESS PROCESSES 
• 34th Commandant of the Marine Corps, Gen James T. Conway: MARADMIN 
014/08 CONTINUOUS PROCESS IMPROVEMENT (CPI) IMPLEMENTATION POLICY 
(see below) 
 
FM CMC WASHINGTON DC(UC)  
TO AL MARADMIN(UC)  
MARADMIN  
R 071517Z JAN 08 
UNCLAS  
SUBJ:USMC CONTINUOUS PROCESS IMPROVEMENT (CPI) IMPLEMENTATION POLICY  
MARADMIN 014/08  
MSGID/GENADMIN/CMC WASHINGTON DC IL LR//  






REF/F/MSGID: USMC CPI GUIDEBOOK/-/21DEC2007//  
NARR/REF A IS THE SECNAV/CMC/CNO MEMO ON DON OBJECTIVES FOR FY 2008 AND 
BEYOND THAT CALLS FOR THE ACCELERATION OF LEAN SIX SIGMA (LSS) 
INTEGRATION ACROSS THE DON IN ORDER TO DEVELOP A CULTURE OF CONTINUOUS 
IMPROVEMENT.  REF B IS A DEPSECDEF MEMO ESTABLISHING DoD-WIDE CPI 
PROGRAMS.  REF C IS A SECNAV MEMO ON TRANSFORMATION THROUGH LSS.  REF D 
IS THE ACMC MSG DIRECTING THE USE OF INNOVATION AND CPI TOOLS TO 
INCREASE COMBAT READINESS AND SUPPORT TO THE WARFIGHTER.  REF E 
CONTAINS INITIAL CPI REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.  REF F IS A REFERENCE 
DOCUMENT FOR CPI PRACTITIONERS AND CONTAINS THE CURRENT BODY OF 
KNOWLEDGE AND TERMINOLOGY CONSISTENT WITH DoD AND DON CPI STANDARDS AND 
GUIDANCE.  REF F PROVIDES THE BASIS FOR A SERIES OF FUTURE CPI 
MARADMINS DURING FY08.//  
POC/EISSINGER/GS15/UNIT:LR/-/TEL:DSN 225-5768/TEL:COMM 703 695-5768 
/EMAIL:JOEL.EISSINGER@USMC.MIL// 
GENTEXT/REMARKS/GENTEXT/REMARKS/ 
1.  THE REFS DIRECTED THE USE OF CPI TO IMPROVE COMBAT READINESS.  CPI 
IS NOW BEING USED ACROSS THE MARINE CORPS WITH CONSIDERABLE SUCCESS.  
THIS MESSAGE IS THE FIRST IN A SERIES OF MARADMINS THAT WILL PROVIDE 
POLICY AND GUIDANCE FOR THE APPLICATION OF CPI IN THE MARINE CORPS 
PENDING PUBLICATION OF A MARINE CORPS ORDER ON CPI. 
2.  STATUS  
A.  HIGH IMPACT CORE VALUE STREAMS (HICVS).  HICVS ARE STRATEGIC 
PROCESSES THAT SUPPORT COMBAT READINESS AND THE WARFIGHTER.  THE MARINE 
REQUIREMENTS OVERSIGHT COUNCIL (MROC) DESIGNATED NINE USMC HICVS.  THE 
MROC ALSO DESIGNATED SENIOR LEADERS TO BE RESPONSIBLE FOR MANAGING, 
COORDINATING, IMPROVING, AND REPORTING THE OVERALL PERFORMANCE OF THE 
66 
HICVS, EVEN THOUGH IT MAY CROSS ORGANIZATIONAL LINES.  WORK HAS BEGUN 
TO DEFINE (OR "MAP") THE NINE HICVS, DEVELOP PRIORITIZED PLANS WITHIN 
EACH HICVS FOR IMPROVEMENT, AND INITIATE IMPROVEMENT PROJECTS.  ACROSS 
THE USMC, OVER 200 IMPROVEMENT PROJECTS HAVE BEEN INITIATED AND 120 
COMPLETED. RESULTS INCLUDE IMPROVED QUALITY OF LIFE AND SAFETY, REDUCED 
CYCLE TIME, REDUCED ERRORS OR REWORK, AND IMPROVED UTILIZATION OF USMC 
RESOURCES.  THE NINE HICVS AND THEIR DESIGNATED LEADERS ARE: 
HICVS:                                        HICVS LEADERS:  
ACQUISITION                                   CG, MARCORSYSCOM  
AVIATION MATERIAL LIFE CYCLE MGMT (AIRSPEED)  DC, AVN  
CAPABILITY DEVELOPMENT                        DC, CD&I  
HUMAN RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT                   DC, M&RA  
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY                        DIR, C4/CIO  
INSTALLATION MANAGEMENT                       DC, I&L  
RESOURCE ALLOCATION                           DC, P&R  
SERVICE ADVOCACY                              DC, PP&O  
TOTAL LIFE CYCLE MGMT (GROUND)                DC, I&L  
B.  TRAINING  
(1) SENIOR LEADER TRAINING.  SECNAV ESTABLISHED A GOAL TO PROVIDE 
CPI TRAINING TO 100 PERCENT OF FLAG/SES AND COL/GS-15 (NSPS EQUIVALENT) 
SENIOR LEADERS BY THE END OF CY07.  MARINES IN JOINT ASSIGNMENTS ARE 
NOT INCLUDED IN THIS GOAL.  ADDITIONALLY, OPERATIONAL FORCE BILLETS AT 
THE MEF OR LOWER ECHELON-LEVEL ARE EXCLUDED UNTIL SUCH TIME THAT 
CONTINGENCY REQUIREMENTS ALLOW FOR THEIR PARTICIPATION IN THIS CRITICAL 
IMPROVEMENT EFFORT.  THE CURRENT STATUS IS 81 PERCENT TRAINED.  
COMMANDS WILL CONTINUE TO ACHIEVE AND MAINTAIN THE GOAL OF 100 PERCENT 
OF SENIOR LEADERS TRAINED AND REPORT STATUS AS PART OF MONTHLY 
REPORTING TO CMC (LR) DESCRIBED IN PARA 3B(5) BELOW. 
(2) LEAN SIX SIGMA BLACK BELT AND GREEN BELT TRAINING.  SECDEF 
AND SECNAV ALSO ESTABLISHED GOALS FOR A PERCENTAGE OF THE AFFECTED 
WORKFORCE TO RECEIVE LSS BLACK BELT OR GREEN BELT TRAINING.  THIS GOAL 
IS INTENDED TO MAKE ORGANIZATIONS SELF-SUSTAINING IN CPI/LSS AND TO 
ENSURE TRAINING IS CONDUCTED IAW DON STANDARDS.  A FORTHCOMING MARADMIN 
WILL PROVIDE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ABOUT CPI TRAINING, CERTIFICATION, 
AND THE AFFECTED WORKFORCE GOALS.  ONE IMPORTANT TRAINING REQUIREMENT 
IS THAT CPI PROJECTS MUST BE ASSIGNED TO INDIVIDUALS BEFORE BLACK OR 
GREEN BELT TRAINING COMMENCES.  THE UTILIZATION OF THESE TRAINED BLACK 
AND GREEN BELTS AND THE STATUS OF THEIR ASSIGNED PROJECTS IS REPORTED 
TO SECNAV ON A MONTHLY BASIS AND IS AN INDICATOR OF USMC SUCCESS IN 
IMPROVING SUPPORT TO THE WARFIGHTER.  WE CURRENTLY HAVE 50 BLACK BELTS 
AND 179 GREEN BELTS TRAINED. 
(3) TRAINING REQUESTS FOR USMC SPONSORED CPI/LSS TRAINING CAN BE 
MADE THROUGH THE CHAIN OF COMMAND TO CMC (LR).  A LIST OF SCHEDULED 
CLASSES WITH LOCATION IS AVAILABLE AT THE LR WEB SITE (FROM THE HQMC 
WEBSITE (WWW.HQMC.USMC.MIL), SELECT 'INSTALLATIONS AND LOGISTICS 
DEPARTMENT,'THEN SELECT 'DIVISIONS,' THEN SELECT 'LR, MC BUSINESS 
ENTERPRISE OFFICE'). 
3.  ACTIONS  
A.  THE MROC HAS CPI OVERSIGHT RESPONSIBILITY.  
B.  HICVS LEADERS, MARFOR (COM, PAC, RES) COMMANDERS, AND CGS, 
MARCORLOGCOM AND MARCORSYSCOM WILL:  
(1) USE CPI TO IMPROVE COMBAT READINESS AND WARFIGHTING 
CAPABILITY.  
(2) CONDUCT ANALYSIS OF RESPECTIVE PROCESSES, IDENTIFY AND 
PRIORITIZE HIGH-IMPACT CPI PROJECTS THAT IMPROVE COMBAT READINESS, AND 
APPLY CPI STANDARD METHODS TO EXECUTE PROJECTS. 
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(3) DESIGNATE A COLONEL/GS-15 (OR NSPS EQUIVALENT) TO SERVE AS 
ORGANIZATIONAL CPI CHAMPION WHO WILL LEAD THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN 
ORGANIZATIONAL CPI PROGRAM THAT ENSURES A TAILORED, SELF-SUFFICIENT CPI 
CAPABILITY.  THEY WILL ALSO PARTICIPATE IN THE MARINE CORPS CPI WORKING 
GROUP ESTABLISHED IN REF D TO COORDINATE CPI IMPLEMENTATION ACROSS THE 
CORPS. 
(4) ENSURE TRAINING IS ACCOMPLISHED AS DIRECTED IN THIS MARADMIN, 
THE REFERENCES, AND THE GUIDANCE CONTAINED IN THE CPI GUIDEBOOK. 
(5) REPORT CPI RESULTS (PER REF E) TO CMC (LR) NLT THE LAST 
WORKING DAY OF EACH MONTH TO INFORM THE MROC AND TO SUPPORT MONTHLY 
SECNAV BRIEFINGS BY THE DIRECTOR, MARINE CORPS STAFF (DMCS). 
C.  THE DC, P&R WILL:  
(1) LEAD THE RESOURCE ALLOCATION HICVS.  
(2) ASSIST DC, I&L TO RESOURCE THE CPI EFFORT.  
D.  THE DC, AVN WILL:  
(1) LEAD PROCESS IMPROVEMENT EFFORTS IN THE USMC AVN MATERIEL 
LIFE CYCLE MANAGEMENT (MLCM) HICVS.  
(2) COORDINATE AS APPROPRIATE WITH THE NAVAIR AIRSPEED PROGRAM 
AND DC, I&L TO ENSURE MAXIMUM ALIGNMENT OF PROCESS IMPROVEMENT CONCEPTS 
AND METHODOLOGIES. 
E.  THE DC, CD&I WILL:  
(1) LEAD THE CAPABILITY DEVELOPMENT, OR EXPEDITIONARY FORCE 
DEVELOPMENT SYSTEM, HICVS.  
(2) ASSIST ORGANIZATIONS IN FORMALLY ESTABLISHING APPROPRIATE 
BILLET STRUCTURE FOR CPI ACTIVITIES WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF DC, I&L, 
HICVS LEADERS, MARFOR COMMANDERS, AND CGS MARCORLOGCOM AND 
MARCORSYSCOM. 
(3) ASSIST DC, I&L TO INCORPORATE CPI KNOWLEDGE INTO TRAINING AND 
EDUCATION.  
F.  THE DC, M&RA WILL:  
(1) LEAD USMC HUMAN RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT HICVS.  
(2) COORDINATE WITH DC, P&R; DC, CD&I; CG, MCRC; DON CIVILIAN 
HUMAN RESOURCE OFFICE (CHRO); AND DIR, AR DIV TO ENSURE THESE EFFORTS 
ARE ALIGNED WITH THE USMC HUMAN RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT HICVS. 
G.  THE DC, I&L WILL:  
(1) LEAD THE TOTAL LIFE CYCLE MANAGEMENT (TLCM) AND INSTALLATION 
MANAGEMENT HICVS.  
(2) ENSURE MROC IS INFORMED OF CPI PROGRESS AND ASSEMBLE MONTHLY 
CPI REPORTS IN SUPPORT OF SECNAV UPDATES BY ACMC AND DMCS. 
(3) ISSUE APPROPRIATE CPI IMPLEMENTING POLICY AND, WITH SUPPORT 
FROM DC, P&R, PROVIDE CPI SUPPORT PROGRAMMING OVERSIGHT FOR 
IMPLEMENTING ORGANIZATIONS. 
(4) APPOINT THE DIRECTOR, MARINE CORPS BUSINESS ENTERPRISE OFFICE 
(MCBEO), TO LEAD THE USMC CPI EFFORTS, PROVIDE CPI FUNCTIONAL 
OVERSIGHT, AND CHAIR THE MARINE CORPS CPI WORKING GROUP. 
(5) ESTABLISH REGIONAL CPI SUPPORT TEAMS MANNED WITH CPI BLACK 
BELTS AND MASTER BLACK BELTS.  BASED ON THEIR STRATEGIC POSITIONING 
THROUGHOUT THE CORPS, CPI SUPPORT TEAMS WILL ASSIST SUPPORTED 
COMMANDERS AND HICVS LEADERS WITH IMPLEMENTATION AND EXECUTION OF A 
TAILORED, SELF-SUFFICIENT CPI CAPABILITY.  WHILE DC, I&L RETAINS FULL 
AUTHORITY AND FINANCIAL/NSPS SUPPORT RESPONSIBILITIES OVER CPI SUPPORT 
TEAMS, THEIR EFFECTIVENESS IS WHOLLY DEPENDENT ON THE USE OF THE 
SUPPORTED COMMAND'S AUTHORITY.  THUS, SUPPORTED/SUPPORTING COMMAND 
RELATIONSHIPS MUST BE ESTABLISHED BASED ON THE UNIQUE REQUIREMENTS 
ASSOCIATED WITH THEIR STRATEGIC POSITIONING AND THE NEEDS OF THE 
SUPPORTED COMMANDER OR HICVS LEADER.  SUPPORTED MARFOR COMMANDERS AND 
HICVS LEADERS WILL ASSIST DC, I&L TO REFINE THE REQUIREMENTS (NUMBER, 
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LOCATION, SIZE) AND SUPPORT COMMAND AUTHORITY REQUIREMENTS FOR REGIONAL 
CPI SUPPORT TEAMS THROUGH THE MARINE CORPS CPI WORKING GROUP. 
(6) ENSURE CPI SUPPORT TEAMS POSSESS EXPERTISE AND CAPABILITY TO 
PROVIDE SUPPORTED ORGANIZATIONAL LEADERS WITH ASSISTANCE/ADVICE IN THE 
FOLLOWING AREAS:  CPI PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT; HIGH-LEVEL PROCESS MAPPING; 
PROJECT DEVELOPMENT, PRIORITIZATION, AND EXECUTION; CPI PROGRAM LESSONS 
RETRIEVAL/COLLECTION/SHARING; AND, CPI MENTORSHIP AND TRAINING. 
H.  THE CG, MARCORLOGCOM WILL:  
(1) CONTINUE TO ACCELERATE IMPLEMENTATION OF CPI THROUGHOUT 
LOGCOM.  
(2) SUPPORT THE DC, I&L ROLE TO LEAD THE TLCM HICVS.  
(3) COORDINATE AS APPROPRIATE WITH THE DC, I&L TO ENSURE MAXIMUM 
ALIGNMENT OF PROCESS IMPROVEMENT CONCEPTS AND METHODOLOGIES ACROSS THE 
MARINE CORPS. 
I.  THE CG, MARCORSYSCOM, WILL LEAD THE ACQUISITION HICVS.  
J.  THE DIRECTOR, C4, WILL LEAD THE INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY HICVS.  
K.  THE MARINE CORPS CPI WORKING GROUP WILL:  
(1) REPRESENT EACH HICVS LEADER, MARFOR COMMANDER, AND THE CGS OF 
MARCORLOGCOM AND MARCORSYSCOM AT THE COLONEL/GS-15 (OR NSPS EQUIVALENT) 
LEVEL.  
(2) SUPPORT DEVELOPMENT OF CPI POLICY AND TIMELY RESULTS 
REPORTING.  
(3) SUPPORT EFFECTIVE CPI IMPLEMENTATION INCLUDING ISSUES THAT 
CROSS FUNCTIONAL AREAS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND HICVS.  
(4) FACILITATE EFFECTIVE CPI IMPLEMENTATION AND GOVERNANCE.  
4.  CPI INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY (IT) SUPPORT.  
A.  IN COOPERATION WITH NAVAIR, AN AUTOMATED CPI MANAGEMENT 
SYSTEM (CPIMS) TO FACILITATE CPI TRAINING, PROJECT MANAGEMENT, AND 
REPORTING IS CURRENTLY BEING PILOTED.  FULL IMPLEMENTATION IS PLANNED 
DURING FY08.  INTERIM REPORTING GUIDANCE (REF E) IS BEING MODIFIED TO 
BETTER SUPPORT THE TRANSITION TO CPIMS AND WILL BE PROMULGATED IN AN 
UPCOMING MESSAGE. 
B.  THE USMC HAS PURCHASED LICENSES FOR THE CPI SUPPORT TOOLS 
"MINITAB" AND "IGRAFX PROCESS FOR SIX SIGMA" TO SUPPORT PROCESS 
ANALYSIS. DISTRIBUTION INSTRUCTIONS PERTAINING TO THESE IT SUPPORT 
TOOLS WILL BE PROVIDED DURING THE 2D QTR FY08. 
5.  CPI GUIDEBOOK.  VERSION 1.0 IS LOCATED AT THE LR WEB SITE (FROM THE 
HQMC WEBSITE (WWW.HQMC.USMC.MIL), SELECT 'INSTALLATIONS AND LOGISTICS 
DEPARTMENT,' THEN SELECT 'DIVISIONS,' THEN SELECT 'LR, MC BUSINESS 
ENTERPRISE OFFICE'). 
6.  FURTHER INFORMATION ON CPI CAN BE OBTAINED BY CONTACTING MCBEO, 
HQMC (LR) AT 703-695-5768, EMAIL CPI.PROGRAM.OFFICE@USMC.MIL. 
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APPENDIX C: FORMAL TRAINING DAYS PER TASK 
Task MOS Course Title Rank Days
911 dispatch 5811 Basic Military Police High Risk Personnel E3 6
911 dispatch 5819 Military Police Investigator Crisis/Hostage Negotiation E5 10
911 dispatch 5821 Criminal Investigator CID Agent Crisis/Hostage Negotiation E5 10
Accident investigations/reconstruction 5813 Accident Investigator Traffic Reconstruction E5 10
Adjudged Confinement 5831 Correctional Specialist Naval Corrections Academy E1 29
Animal Control 5811 Basic Military Police Military Working Dog Handler Course E1 55
Conduct complete investigation on assumable cases 5819 Military Police Investigator Military Police Investigator Course E4 40
Conduct complete investigation on assumable cases 5821 Criminal Investigator CID Agent Apprentice CID Special Agent Course E5 75
Conduct complete investigation on assumable cases 5821 Criminal Investigator CID Agent CID Certification E5 12
Conduct complete investigation on assumable cases 5821 Criminal Investigator CID Agent Scientific Content Analysis E5 4
Conduct complete investigation on assumable cases 5811 Basic Military Police FBI National Academy E6 76
Conduct complete investigation on assumable cases 5821 Criminal Investigator CID Agent FBI National Academy E6 76
Conduct complete investigation on assumable cases 5821 Criminal Investigator CID Agent Forensic PDD Refresher E6 20
Conduct complete investigation on assumable cases 5821 Criminal Investigator CID Agent Forensics in a Windows Environment E6 10
Conduct complete investigation on assumable cases 5821 Criminal Investigator CID Agent Seized Computer Recovery Specialist E6 10
Conduct complete investigation on assumable cases 5822 Polygraph Examiner Forensic PDD (Polygraph) Program E6 60
Conduct complete investigation on assumable cases 5822 Polygraph Examiner Senior Examiner Course E7 5
Conduct preliminary investigation on referable cases 5811 Basic Military Police Street Gangs Identification and Investigation E4 5
Conduct preliminary investigation on referable cases 5821 Criminal Investigator CID Agent Street Gangs Identification and Investigation E4 5
Conduct preliminary investigation on referable cases 5819 Military Police Investigator REID Techniques of Interview and Interrogation E5 3
Conduct preliminary investigation on referable cases 5821 Criminal Investigator CID Agent Practical Kinesic Interview & Interrogations E5 5
Conduct preliminary investigation on referable cases 5821 Criminal Investigator CID Agent REID Techniques of Interview and Interrogation E5 3
Conduct preliminary investigation on referable cases 5821 Criminal Investigator CID Agent Sexual Assault Investigations Training E5 5
Conduct preliminary investigation on referable cases 5811 Basic Military Police Intelligence In Combating Terrorism E6 10
Conduct preliminary investigation on referable cases 5821 Criminal Investigator CID Agent Advanced Crime Scene Investigative Techniques E6 9
Conduct preliminary investigation on referable cases 5821 Criminal Investigator CID Agent Advanced Fraud Investigations E6 10
Conduct preliminary investigation on referable cases 5821 Criminal Investigator CID Agent Computer Incident Response Course E6 10
Conduct preliminary investigation on referable cases 5821 Criminal Investigator CID Agent Introduction to Computer Networks & Computer Hardware E6 10
Conduct preliminary investigation on referable cases 5822 Polygraph Examiner Advanced Polygraph Studies Program E7 10
Conduct preliminary investigation on referable cases 5822 Polygraph Examiner Polygraph Countermeasures E7 5
Conduct preliminary investigation on referable cases 5822 Polygraph Examiner PDD Managers Course E8 5
Correctional Custody Unit 5832 Correctional Counselor Correctional Counselor E4 25
Crime Prevention/Physical Security 5811 Basic Military Police Child Abuse Prevention Investigative Techniques E3 8
Crime Prevention/Physical Security 5814 Physical Security Specialist Conventional Physical Security Course E3 10
Crime Prevention/Physical Security 5814 Physical Security Specialist Crime Prevention Techniques and Programs E3 10
Crime Prevention/Physical Security 5821 Criminal Investigator CID Agent Child Abuse Prevention Investigative Techniques E3 8
Crime Prevention/Physical Security 5821 Criminal Investigator CID Agent Crime Prevention Techniques and Programs E3 10
Customs operations 5811 Basic Military Police Military Police Basic Course E1 8
Drug Detection 5811 Basic Military Police Military Police Basic Course E1 8
Emergency Response 5811 Basic Military Police Individual Terrorism Awareness Course E1 5
Emergency Response 5811 Basic Military Police Interservice Nonlethal Individual Weapons Instructor Course (INIWIC) E4 10
Emergency Response 5816 Special Reaction Team Member Dynamic Entry Basic Course E4 10
Emergency Response 5811 Basic Military Police Anti-Terrorism Instructor Qualification Course (For Level I Brief Instructors) E6 10
Emergency Response 5811 Basic Military Police Anti-Terrorism Officer (ATO) (Naval Unit Advisor Specific) E6 5
Emergency Response 5811 Basic Military Police Anti-Terrorism Program Manager (Unit Advisors & Program Managers) E6 5
Emergency Response 5811 Basic Military Police Dynamics of International Terrorism E6 5
Emergency Response 5821 Criminal Investigator CID Agent Anti-Terrorism Officer (ATO) (Naval Unit Advisor Specific) E6 5
Emergency Response 5821 Criminal Investigator CID Agent Anti-Terrorism Program Manager E6 5
Emergency Response 5821 Criminal Investigator CID Agent Dynamics of International Terrorism E6 5
Explosive Detection 5811 Basic Military Police Military Police Basic Course E1 8
Flight Line Security 5811 Basic Military Police Military Police Basic Course E1 8
Game Warden services 5811 Basic Military Police Military Police Basic Course E1 8
Installation access control 5811 Basic Military Police Military Police Basic Course E1 8
Intrusion Detection System monitoring 5814 Physical Security Specialist Electronic Surveillance Systems and Administrative Design Course E4 10
MP patrols 5811 Basic Military Police Military Police Basic Course E1 8
MWD law enforcement/security patrols 5811 Basic Military Police Air Mobility Command Phoenix Raven Program E1 14
MWD law enforcement/security patrols 5812 Working Dog Handler Military Working Dog Phoenix Readiness Course E1 15
MWD law enforcement/security patrols 5816 Special Reaction Team Member Air Mobility Command Phoenix Raven Program E1 14
MWD law enforcement/security patrols 5812 Working Dog Handler Military Working Dog Supervisor Course E3 20
Non-emergency patrol police services 5811 Basic Military Police Domestic Violence Intervention Training E3 5
Non-emergency patrol police services 5821 Criminal Investigator CID Agent Domestic Violence Intervention Training E3 5
Non-emergency patrol police services 5821 Criminal Investigator CID Agent WMD/CBNRE Crime Scene Processing E6 10
Non-law enforcement action 5811 Basic Military Police Management of Small Law Enforcement Agency E7 5
Non-law enforcement action 5811 Basic Military Police Leadership Team Awareness Course E8 5
Non-law enforcement action 5821 Criminal Investigator CID Agent Management of Small Law Enforcement Agency E7 5
Pass Issued 5811 Basic Military Police Military Police Basic Course E1 7
Police records/reports 5811 Basic Military Police Narcotic Identification and Investigation E4 5
Police records/reports 5821 Criminal Investigator CID Agent Narcotic Identification and Investigation E4 5
Police records/reports 5822 Polygraph Examiner Law Enforcement Quality Control E7 5
Pretrial Confinement 5831 Correctional Specialist Enemy Detainee Operations Course (EDOC) E1 10
Protective Service Operations 5811 Basic Military Police Protective Services Training & Antiterrorism Driving Course E4 15
Protective Service Operations 5821 Criminal Investigator CID Agent Protective Services Training & Antiterrorism Driving Course E4 15
SRT emergency response 5816 Special Reaction Team Member Special Reaction Team/Marksman Observer Course E3 10
SRT security details 5811 Basic Military Police Smith & Wesson Defensive Tactics Instructor Course E4 5
Traffic Court/Board liaison 5822 Polygraph Examiner Fundamentals of Courtroom Testimony E6 5
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